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ABSTRACT
One of the most pressing problems of current constitutional law in the 
aftermath of September 11 is how to balance constitutional rights and 
national security interests. No one however seems to pause and ask should
we balance individual rights and national security interests and if so when. 
One of the reasons for this is the widespread acceptance of what I shall term 
in this Article, the balancing consciousness: the view that every problem 
can and should be solved through balancing conflicting considerations. 
This Article demonstrates that the balancing consciousness is 
misleading. Not every problem can and should be solved through balancing 
conflicting considerations. Instead of the balancing consciousness, this 
Article argues for a dual model, which envisions two logical forms of 
decision-making—balancing and non-balancing. This model has far-
reaching implication for constitutional adjudication.
The dual model is based on a distinction between two levels, or orders, 
of considerations: first-order considerations, and second-order 
considerations. The Article argues that constitutional rights can be divided 
between these two types of considerations, and that balancing between a 
constitutional right and a governmental interest is appropriate only when the 
constitutional right is of the first order, not when it is of the second order. 
Interestingly this insight, concerning the limited scope of balancing, was 
once acknowledged in constitutional jurisprudence, but has since been 
abandoned. This Article is therefore also a call for reinstalling the original 
scope of balancing as it was once installed in American constitutional law.
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We cannot know for certain the sort of issues with which the Court will 
grapple in the third century of its existence. But there is no reason to doubt 
that it will continue as a vital and uniquely American institutional participant 
in the everlasting search of civilized society for the proper balancing between 
liberty and authority, between the state and the individual.
—William H. Rehnquist, 
The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is1
[There is a] nearly universal elite legal academic view that we could indeed 
resolve all situations where there is choice of norm by balancing conflicting 
considerations of one kind or another.
—Duncan Kennedy
From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy2
1 WILLIAM  H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 319 (1987).
2
 Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s 
“Consideration and Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 94-95 (2000).
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most pressing problems of current constitutional law in the 
aftermath of September 11 is how to balance constitutional rights and national 
security interests.3 No one however seems to pause and ask should we balance 
individual rights and national security interests and if so when. One of the reasons 
for this is the widespread acceptance of what I shall term in this Article, the 
balancing consciousness: the view that every problem can and should be solved 
through balancing conflicting considerations. This view is shared by legal as well 
as non-legal thinkers and is supported by two appealing arguments. The first 
argument holds that every practical problem can be reduced, in principle, to the 
relative assessment of conflicting considerations for and against a course of action 
(e.g., the individual rights consideration and the national security interest 
consideration). The second argument holds that the only alternative to balancing 
is the creation of absolute or unbalanceable considerations. Since absolute 
considerations are untenable according to this argument (e.g. individual rights can 
never be absolute) it follows that balancing must apply to every decision.4
Despite the appeal of these two arguments, this Article demonstrates that the 
view that every decision can and should be solved through balancing is 
misleading. It shows that not every decision is reducible to a process of balancing 
conflicting considerations, and that, while the creation of absolute considerations 
is untenable, it is not the only alternative to balancing. Instead of the balancing 
consciousness, which envisions balancing as the only logical form of decision-
making this Article argues for a dual model that envisions two logical forms of 
decision-making—balancing and non-balancing.
3 See, e.g., Searching for Balance: National Security's Threat to Civil Liberties, Stanford Law 
School Panel held on January 2002; Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. 
Civil Liberties, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 175 (2003); Meaghan E. Ferrell, Balancing the First 
Amendment and National Security: Can Immigration Hearings be Closed to Protect the Nation’s 
Interest? 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 981 (2003); Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Balancing Privacy 
and Security in an Age of Terror, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 607 (2004).
4 See infra Part I (reviewing several manifestations of these two arguments).
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The dual model is a synthesis of two theoretical paradigms, from two 
different fields—philosophy and law. The first paradigm, conceived by Oxford 
philosopher, Joseph Raz, establishes the main contours of the dual model and 
provides its principle terminology. The second paradigm, originated by Stanford 
law professor, Mark Kelman, enriches the understanding of the dual model and 
broadens it. The outcome is a new theoretical model, which I call the dual model. 
The dual model refutes the balancing consciousness, but does not refute balancing 
altogether.  The main point of the dual model is the recognition that balancing is a 
special kind of decision-making, applicable only when certain conditions are 
present. Balancing is retained as a viable tool, but only at the price of limiting its 
scope.
What are the conditions for balancing, and what are the two logical modes 
that the dual model identifies? The two logical forms of decision-making conform 
to two logical forms of conflicts. A balancing decision applies only to conflicts 
between two valid or legitimate considerations of the same level (in Raz’s 
terminology, first-order considerations). It does not apply to conflicts between a 
consideration of a higher level (in Raz’s terms a second-order or exclusionary
consideration) and a consideration of a lower level (first-order). When a higher-
level consideration conflicts with a lower-level consideration, the decision is
made by excluding the lower-level consideration completely from the balance, 
rather than by balancing. 
When applied to the constitutional context, the dual model provides a tool for 
determining the applicability of balancing. The question in each constitutional 
case should be: what kind of conflict does the case present? Are both claims in the 
conflict—the constitutional rights claim and the governmental interest claim—
first-order claims? Or, does one of the claims (the constitutional rights claim, 
presumably) function as a second-order claim, thereby totally excluding the 
governmental interest claim?
Reviewing several areas of constitutional law, this Article argues that the 
answer to this question is that constitutional cases present both types of conflicts. 
That is, some constitutional cases involve conflicts between two first-order 
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considerations, and others include conflicts between a second-order consideration 
and a first-order consideration. More specifically, some constitutional cases 
involve constitutional rights claims that are only first-order claims (actually 
constitutional interests claims), and others involve constitutional rights claims 
that are ‘strong’ second-order claims (real rights claims)—the nature of the 
conflict between the constitutional claim and the governmental interests changes 
accordingly.
The application of the dual model to constitutional law therefore reveals two 
distinct types of rights claims within constitutional law. The balancing 
consciousness confounds the two. Since the balancing consciousness holds that 
every conflict should be resolved through balancing, and that every right is 
balanceable, it fails to distinguish between first-order and second-order rights 
claims, and causes several distortions and analytical mistakes that haunt current 
constitutional law.
Interestingly, this analytical confusion was not always part of constitutional 
jurisprudence. A historical review shows that balancing was once properly 
assigned only to first-order conflicts, and that the current confusion within 
constitutional law was created at a certain point in time in American legal history 
and as a result of a certain events. This Article is therefore also a call for 
reinstalling the original meaning of balancing as it was originally developed in 
American constitutional law.
The article can be divided into two main sections. The first section, consisting 
of Parts I-III, refutes the balancing consciousness both generally and in 
constitutional law, and replaces it by the dual model. Part I presents the balancing 
consciousness, describes its two supporting arguments, and demonstrates some of 
the reasons for its widespread acceptance. Part II presents the dual model, starting 
from Raz’s model and complementing it with Kelman’s model. The combination 
of the two models creates a new model, the dual model, which refutes the 
balancing consciousness on both its supporting arguments. A possible objection to 
the model is reviewed as well as its main implications. Part III then moves on to 
apply the dual model to constitutional law. Starting with the right to free speech, 
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constitutional cases involving free speech are divided into cases involving free 
speech as a first-order interest and cases involving free speech as a second-order 
right. Part III then looks at two other constitutional areas, dormant commerce 
clause and equal protection, and shows that they can also be divided in the same 
way. 
The second section of the article, consisting of Parts IV and V, employs the 
dual model to criticize central aspects of constitutional law in historical 
perspective. Part IV reviews the historical development of balancing in American 
constitutional law.  It shows that balancing first appeared in American 
constitutional law when the progressives used it to criticize the notorious 
Lochner5 Court. This Part argues that such a use of balancing, which I term early 
balancing, was consistent with the dual model and indeed associated balancing 
with the idea that some rights were only first-order interests. Early balancing also 
associated balancing, surprisingly, with judicial restraint. Only later, around the 
late 1930s, did balancing first appear in its modern form, in which it was 
associated with the rhetoric of rights rather than interests and with judicial 
activism rather than judicial restraint. This later form of the use of balancing, 
which I term modern balancing, is consistent with the balancing consciousness 
rather than with the dual model. It represents an unfortunate combination of rights 
rhetoric and balancing, and distorts the nature of constitutional conflicts by 
creating two major problems that still haunt constitutional law today. 
Part V combines the historical review with the analytical discussion of the 
dual model to form a criticism of two major problems in current constitutional 
law. Using case studies from the same constitutional areas that were discussed in 
Part III (freedom of speech, the dormant commerce clause, and equal protection) 
this Part demonstrates that in each of these areas there are examples of the first-
order manifestation of the right being confused with the second-order 
manifestation of the right (the first-to-second order mix-up) and examples of the 
second-order manifestation of the right being confused with the first-order 
5
 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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manifestation of the right (the second-to-first order mix-up). That is, on the one 
hand we have cases in which a right-oriented balancing, distorts the same-level 
nature of a first-order conflict by suggesting that the constitutional rights 
consideration is somehow different in nature and elevated above the governmental 
consideration. On the other hand, we have a balancing-oriented attitude towards 
real rights that distorts the non-balanceable, second-order nature of some rights 
by suggesting that they are merely interests that must be balanced with the 
governmental interests that conflict with them. Modern Balancing and the 
balancing consciousness therefore create distortions of two opposite kinds: at 
times they unnecessarily elevate constitutional rights, and at other times they 
unnecessarily lower them, depending on the case and the type of right.
This Article offers a theory of balancing, portraying both the limits of 
balancing and its legitimate scope. In this it differs from most other critical essays 
on balancing, which tend to concentrate only on balancing’s problems and 
deficiencies.6 It also attempts a novel distinction between two historical periods of 
balancing, highlighting the fact that current balancing is different than its early 
predecessor.7 Lastly, while partially motivated by issues concerning balancing 
that have arisen in the aftermath of September 11, this Article does not address 
those issues directly. Rather the reader is hopefully left with better analytical 
6 See, e.g., Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L. J. 1424 (1962) 
(criticizing balancing in First Amendment law during the McCarthy era); Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943 (1987) (criticizing balancing in 
constitutional law generally); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary 
Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 707, 724 (1994) (rejecting balancing as the 
leading model for constitutional interpretation); Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation 
in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV 779, 801-4  (1994) (arguing against balancing different kinds of valuations 
in the law); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001) (rejecting 
balancing in First Amendment interpretation).
7
 While there are several accounts of the history of balancing and of its origins (See, e.g., 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 18-19 (1992); Aleinikoff, id. at 952-63,) no one, to the best of my knowledge, has ever 
argued that there are two different periods of balancing and that early balancing is different than 
modern balancing.
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tools, and some historical perspective, to make up her own mind concerning the 
current balancing problems of the day.
I. THE BALANCING CONSCIOUSNESS
Balancing is one of the oldest and most familiar metaphors in Western 
culture.8 The physical manifestation of the metaphor is the act of balancing the 
two sides of the scale.9 The mental aspect of the metaphor is a decision-making 
method that requires contemplation of the relative importance or weight of two or 
more considerations in favor of or against a course of action.10
8 See, e.g., HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASON ABOUT FINAL ENDS, p. 166, n. 2 (1997) 
(“the metaphorical use of the terms ‘weighing’ and ‘balancing’ is well entrenched in Western 
culture—embodied, as it is, in the figure of blind Justice.”) The earliest text to use the metaphor is 
also one of the earliest human texts ever. It is the Acadian epos, The Epic of Gilgamesh, which dates 
back to the third millennium B.C. The figure of Gilgamesh is introduced as: “He who… weighed 
[the apparent and the hidden] in the scales of wisdom”. THE EPIC OF GILGAMESH, 27 (Tel Aviv, 
1992, in Hebrew); See also the following overview of the use of the scales metaphor in ancient times 
in Dennis E. Curtis and Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L. J. 1727, 1741, n. 32 (1987): 
The scales seem to have been used as a symbol of a decision-making device since earliest 
times. In the Egyptian ‘Book of the Dead’ (ca. 1400 B.C.), the soul of a dead person is 
shown being weighed in a balance. One pan holds a heart-shaped vase symbolizing all of the 
actions of the dead person; the other pan contains a feather, symbolizing Right and Truth. 
The Old Testament refers to scales: ‘Let me be weighed in an even balance, that God may 
know mine integrity.’ Job 31:6. Weighing as a symbol of Divine Judgment is also found in 
the Koran... In the Iliad, the gods weigh to foretell the results of human events: ‘Then Jove 
his golden scales weighed up, and took the last accounts of Fate for Hector....’ HOMER, THE 
ILIAD, ch. xxii, (R. Fitzgerald trans. 1974). In early Christian representations, the ‘weighing 
of the soul’ occurs in numerous Last Judgment scenes, often with Saint Michael holding the 
scales.
9 See Curtis and Resnik Id.
10 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS 35 (2nd ed., 1999) (defining 
balancing in practical reason as “[resolving] conflicts [among different reasons for action] by the 
relative weight or strength of the conflicting reasons which determines which of them override the 
other.”) The metaphor can allude to a broader scope of mental activity than decision-making. 
Balancing can be an operation that concerns any kind of deliberation, whether of deciding what to 
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A more detailed description of the decision-making method implied by 
balancing involves three stages. In the first stage, all the various considerations 
involved in the decision are identified. In the second stage, each is assigned a 
value or a weight according to its respective importance.11 Finally, all 
considerations are put on the scale and weighed.12
Thus described, balancing appears to have become the predominant way to 
solve both legal problems and moral problems generally.13  As the quote in the 
do (practical reasoning), or forming a belief or opinion (theoretical reasoning.) Indeed one of the 
meanings of the verb to “balance” is simply to “deliberate” (THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY vol. 
I, 894 (sec. ed. 1989)). However, for reasons of simplicity, this Article will concentrate only on 
deliberation concerning deciding what to do, which is a broad enough category as it is.
11
 Describing constitutional balancing according to the first two stages, Alexander Aleinikoff 
writes: “[b]y a ‘balancing opinion’ I mean a judicial opinion that analyzes a constitutional question 
by identifying interests implicated by the case and… assigning values to the identified interests.” 
Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 945.
12
 The third stage of balancing is sometimes omitted from the description since it is 
superfluous. Once the weights are assigned the outcome is already determined, and a further stage is 
unnecessary. A famous example of describing balancing according to all three stages, is Benjamin 
Franklin’s letter to a perplexed friend: 
My way [of making difficult decisions] is, to divide half a sheet of paper by a line into two 
columns; writing over the one pro and over the other con; then, during three or four days’ 
consideration, I put down, under the different heads, short hints of the different motives, 
that at different times occur to me, for or against the measure. When I have thus got them 
altogether in one view, I endeavor to estimate their respective weights… and thus 
proceeding, I find where the balance lies. 
Benjamin Franklin in a letter to Joseph Priestley (quoted in ALEXANDER BAIN, THE EMOTIONS AND 
THE WILL, 424-5 (1865)) (emphases in original). The fascinating topic of the metaphor of balancing 
and its difficulties is not explored in this Article. For some philosophical accounts of this topic see 
ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 280 (1958); John Plamenatz, Interests, 2 POLITICAL STUDIES 1, 5-6 
(1958); Elijah Millgram, Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning, in RUTH CHANG (ED.), 
INCOMMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 151, 159 (1997). 
13
 The prevalence of balancing in solving moral problems can be established only indirectly, 
through comments on prevailing moral conceptions. See, e.g., infra note 15. The prevalence of 
balancing in the law can be established also more directly. Professor Kahn, for example, found out 
that “the word ‘balance’ or ‘balancing’ does appear in 214 of the 473 cases decided in the last three 
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beginning of this Article conveys, the view that all conflicts can, and should, be 
resolved by balancing conflicting considerations—the balancing consciousness—
has become “a nearly universal elite legal academic view.”14 It is further said to 
“reflect the general consciousness both among laymen and jurists.”15 What 
accounts for this phenomenon? There are two persuasive arguments, each 
supported by ideological underpinnings, that account for the balancing 
consciousness’ prevalence both within the law and outside the law.
The first argument for the balancing consciousness is positive and I refer to it 
as the reducibility argument. It maintains that balancing is fundamental to every 
instance of decision-making. The second is negative, and I refer to it as the anti-
absolutist argument. It maintains that balancing is unavoidable in every instance 
of decision-making. The reducibility argument holds that every decision can be 
reduced, in principle, to the assessment of the relative strength of the competing 
considerations involved in the decision.16 The considerations that conflict may 
vary in their weight or type from one case to the other,17 but the crucial point is 
years [preceding 1987].” Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: the 
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L. J. 1, 3 note 14 (1987). Aleinikoff notes that “[e]very 
sitting Justice on the Supreme Court has relied on balancing [and] as a result, balancing now 
dominates major areas of constitutional law.” Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 964-65.
14
 Kennedy, supra note 2. 
15 ROSS, supra note 12, at 279 -80. It is worth quoting the passage in full: “A widely held view, 
which undoubtedly even better than Kant’s formalism reflects the general consciousness both 
among laymen and jurists, declares that justice means the equal balancing of all the interests 
affected by a certain decision.”
16 See, e.g., the following claim:
When choosing a legal norm to cover a case, rational decision-making selects from the 
continuum of normative possibilities the one that best accommodates (balances…) the 
conflicting considerations as they play out more or less strongly in the fact situation of 
which the case is an instance… [A]ny norm can be looked at as the product of this kind of 
analysis, and assessed as such.
Kennedy, supra note 2, at 105 (describing modern legal thinking) (emphasis added).
17
 Kennedy, for example, divides the possible kinds of considerations that may conflict in a 
legal case into ‘formal,’ ‘substantive’ and ‘institutional’ considerations. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 
95.
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that no matter what the considerations are, any decision can ultimately be 
described as being based on a balance between at least two conflicting 
considerations. Justice Felix Frankfurter, for example, famously wrote: “the core 
of the difficulty is that there is hardly a question of any real difficulty before the 
court that does not entail more than one so-called principle.” 18 And Duncan 
Kennedy writes that “[i]t never makes sense, when justifying a rule, to say this it 
is good because it promotes [one value or interest]. To make sense it must add: at 
an acceptable cost to [the opposite values or interest.]”19
The anti-absolutist argument for the balancing consciousness addresses the 
same insight from a negative perspective. Since every decision involves more 
than one consideration, no single consideration can, or should be given absolute 
importance. Balancing is therefore unavoidable since it stands in contrast to the 
creation of absolute considerations. In the realm of constitutional rights, this 
argument takes on the familiar form of rejecting the idea that rights can ever be 
absolute: “Balancing is problematic…Yet, the alternative to balancing seems 
much worse…[The alternative is] to create an absolute right…Few rights can or
should be regarded as absolute.”20
Both arguments for the balancing consciousness are founded on major 
schools of thought. The reducibility argument relies foremost on utilitarianism. 
According to utilitarianism one should always decide on a course of action that 
results in maximum utility. This ideology therefore supports the view that at the 
core of every moral (and rational) decision lies a process of balancing the pros 
and cons of a given course of action.21 One of the modern offspring of 
18 FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 43 (1956).
19
 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 113 (describing modern legal thinking).
20
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Scholarship in the 1990s, 45 HASTINGS. L. J. 1105, 
1116-17 (1994) (emphasis added).
21 See, e.g., the following utilitarian justification for balancing: “The goal of morality [is] to 
lessen the overall evil or harm in the world. [Therefore one must always] balance harms and benefits 
[and ask]: Is the harm involved in acting against the rule greater than the benefit to be attained by 
doing so?” BERNARD GERT, CHARES CULVER, AND K. DANNER CLOUSER, BIOETHICS: A RETURN TO 
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utilitarianism, economic analysis in the humanities and in the law, also supports 
the idea that every decision is reducible to balancing. Economic analysis teaches 
us to look at the costs of any course of action and to regard any decision as a 
trade-off between opposing considerations. The idea of putting a price tag on each 
course of action implies that every decision is reducible to cost benefit
balancing.22
The anti-absolutist argument for the balancing consciousness relies on 
philosophical anti-absolutist movements, such as pragmatism and 
instrumentalism, which reject the idea of absolutes in morals, in practical 
reasoning and in law.23 These movements espouse the view that human endeavor 
should concentrate on attaining pragmatic ends, not on the false search for 
absolute and immutable first principles or values. Balancing the interests affected 
by our decisions reflects such a pragmatic approach, while refusing to balance is 
embracing the false and unattainable ideal of absolute certainties. Justice 
Frankfurter is again the best legal representative of this ideology as it applies to 
balancing:
[Absolute] rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions. [It is better to 
decide by] candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the 
confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the 
non-Euclidean problems to be solved. 24
The anti-absolutist argument is also backed by economic analysis as a mirror 
argument to its support for the reducibility argument. According to this line of 
FUNDAMENTALS (1997), pp. 62, 86 and 254, cited in Henry Richardson, Specifying, Balancing, and 
Interpreting Bioethical Principles, 25 J. MED. & PHIL. 285, 294-95 (2000).
22
 For a critical review of cost benefit balancing see Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of Cost 
Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 971 (2000); For a general review of balancing and its relation to 
Law and Economics, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of 
(A Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997).
23
 For a review of the connection between balancing and pragmatism both in morals and in the 
law see Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 956-63; see also generally ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 
INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982).
24
 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951).
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argument, the idea of non-balanceable absolutes is a false attempt to disregard the 
simple truth that every choice has a price. No matter how important a right or a 
value may be, it cannot be immune to balancing or to a possible trade-off with 
other values, since it necessarily has a price, and one cannot devote all one’s 
resources to one value only.25
Finally, the ideology of pluralism and multiculturalism adds weight to the 
anti- absolutist argument for balancing. A pluralistic society is committed to the 
idea that different and conflicting world-views can co-exist within it.26 Balancing 
can ensure that no one value gets absolute weight, and no other value gets totally 
rejected. Refusing to balance is therefore tantamount to intolerance and value 
monopoly.27
25 See, e.g., the following argument for balancing the value of human life: 
We cannot avoid trade-offs between the protection of human life and other goods such as 
economic growth, for we cannot reasonably devote unlimited resources to human life… by 
indefinitely expanding medical expenditures, police forces, and the like. 
Elizabeth Anderson, Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods, in RUTH CHANG (ED.), 
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 90, 105 (1997) (describing 
prevailing economic analyses of values and goods).
26 See, e.g., Chief Justice Burger in Lynch v. Donnelly:
In our modern, complex society, whose traditions and constitutional underpinnings rest on 
and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in applying the 
Establishment Clause is simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the Court. 
465 U.S. 668, at 678 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
27 See, e.g., the following description of balancing’s qualities:
[Balancing] aims to give voice to each interest by setting forth a rule that accommodates 
all of them. Ideally, that rule allows each interest its maximum realization consistent with 
recognition of and respect for other competing interests. [Balancing’s] end is recognition 
and reconciliation, not exclusion.
Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: the Jurisprudence of Justice 
Powell, 97 YALE L. J. 1,9 (1987) (describing the philosophy behind Justice Powell’s balancing).
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II. THE DUAL MODEL THESIS
The two arguments mentioned in Part I—the reducibility argument and the 
anti- absolutist argument, —coupled with their ideological underpinnings, create a 
powerful case for the balancing consciousness—the view that balancing is 
fundamental to all decision-making and unavoidable in all cases of decision-
making. This Part attempts to show that the balancing consciousness is misguided 
by presenting a new model for balancing—the dual model. The dual model is a 
synthesis of the works of two scholars: Joseph Raz and Mark Kelman.
A.  Joseph Raz—Balancing and Levels of Reasons
Joseph Raz, in an important essay about practical reasoning,28 describes a 
view which is very similar to the balancing consciousness. It is the view that “all 
practical conflicts of reasons are resolved by the relative weight or strength of the 
conflicting reasons which determines which of them overrides the other.”29 Raz 
terms this view in his essay, P1.30
What Raz then notices is that, contrary to the tenets of the balancing 
consciousness, or P1, not all kinds of conflicts are resolved through balancing. 
Raz presents three examples of conflicts in which the balancing norm does not 
apply. 
The first example is the case of Ann. Ann returns home after a strenuous day 
at work and receives a phone call from a friend. Her friend recommends a certain 
investment, but says that Ann must decide that evening or the offer will expire. 
Although the proposed investment appears very promising, it is also very 
complicated, and the decision requires several hours of thorough investigation. 
Ann replies to her friend that she is too tired to make a rational decision on the 
merits of the case. Raz explains her position:
28 RAZ, supra note 10.
29 Id. at 35.
30
 Raz formalizes this view as follows: “P1: It is always the case that one ought, all things 
considered, to do whatever one ought to do on the balance of reasons.” Id. at 36.
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She is rejecting the offer not because she thinks the reasons against it override 
those in its favour [P1]… but because she has a reason [her fatigue] not to act on 
the merits of the case. This, she concedes is a kind of reason not recognized in P1, 
but that only shows that P1 is not valid.31
The second example is the case of Jeremy. Jeremy serves in the army and is 
ordered by his commander to confiscate a civilian van for military use. Jeremy’s 
friend tries to convince him that confiscating the van would be wrong, because, 
on balance, confiscating the van would bring more harm than benefit. Jeremy 
rejects his friend’s attempts and explains:
[T]he order is a reason for doing what you were ordered regardless of the balance 
of reasons… Orders are orders and should be obeyed even if… no harm will 
come from disobeying them. That is what it means to be a subordinate. It means 
that it is not for you to decide what is best. You may see that on the balance of 
reasons one course of action is right and yet be justified in not following it.32
The third and final example is the case of Colin. Colin has to decide whether 
to send his son to an expensive and good school, or to a cheaper school of lesser 
quality. If he sends his son to the more expensive school, he will not be able to 
quit his job and write the novel he always wanted to write. In addition if he sends 
his son to the more expensive school, some of his friends will do the same, 
although they cannot afford to do so. However, Colin disregards both these 
considerations because he promised his wife that “in all decisions affecting the 
education of his son he will act only for his son’s interests and disregard all other 
reasons.”33
Raz’s three examples show incidents of decision-making that do not follow 
the balancing consciousness. Had balancing been behind these practical decisions 
or conflicts they ought to have been decided by balancing all the relevant 
considerations and acting according to those that outweighed the others. However, 
Ann does not balance the considerations for and against the investment, because 
31 Id. at 37.
32 Id. at 38.
33 Id. at 39.
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she is tired. Jeremy does not balance the considerations for and against obeying 
the order, because he thinks that this would contradict the idea of being a 
subordinate. And Colin does not balance some of the considerations for or against 
sending his son to an expensive school, because he promised to take into account 
only those considerations that pertain to his son’s interests.
Raz’s examples show the existence of special reasons and special conflicts 
that are not included in the balancing consciousness model. Ann’s fatigue, 
Jeremy’s position, and Colin’s promise are not reasons for or against a course of 
action. Rather, they are reasons not to take into consideration some other reasons. 
They are exclusionary reasons, or second-order reasons: reasons to exclude 
some, or all, first-order reasons from the decision-making process. Such reasons 
do not concern the decision directly, but do concern the (first-order) reasons for 
the proposed decision. Ann’s fatigue is a reason to exclude all the considerations 
for or against the investment. Jeremy’s position is a reason to exclude all 
considerations for or against the confiscation (except for the order itself.) And 
Colin’s promise is a reason to exclude all those considerations not relating to his 
son’s interests.
The special thing about exclusionary reasons is that they are never simply 
balanced with other, regular, or first-order reasons. It is true, according to Raz, 
that when first-order reasons conflict, they are always balanced one against the 
other according to their respective weight or strength (P1). However, when an 
exclusionary reason and a first-order reason conflict, no balancing is pursued. Put 
differently, while it is true for first-order reasons that “they are comparable with 
regard to strength (i.e. that the relation stronger than or of equal strength [applies 
to them,])”34 this is not true for second-order reasons that conflict with first-order 
reasons. In such conflicts, Raz claims, “the strength of the exclusionary reason is 
not put to the test. [Rather, the second-order reason] prevails by virtue of being a 
reason of a higher order.” Raz therefore maintains: “there are two ways in which 
34 Id. at 43 (emphasis in original).
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reasons can be defeated. They can be overridden by strictly conflicting reasons or 
excluded by exclusionary reasons.”35
In conclusion, Raz’s three examples disprove the balancing consciousness, 
P1, by claiming that the pattern of balancing, weight, and overriding does not 
reflect all possible logical patterns of decisions. In particular, it does not reflect 
the relationship between second-order/exclusionary reasons and first-order regular 
reasons. Raz’s examples indicate at least three common types of exclusionary 
reasons that eschew balancing: temporary incapacity to form judgment, 
commands, and promises.36 To this list Raz added: norms,37 and rules.38 Others 
have also added values and desires.39 Taken together these types of reasons form 
an important part of the entire sphere of practical reasoning. “Despite the 
indiscriminate application of the terminology of ‘weight,’ ‘strength,’ ‘overriding,’ 
‘on balance,’ etc.,” Raz concludes, “we do in fact use different modes of 
reasoning to support different practical conclusions.” 40
Several clarifications to the above review of Raz’s theory are in order:
1. Raz’s theory is a descriptive or phenomenological theory, not a normative 
theory. That is, Raz’s examples show that people do in fact regard some reasons 
as exclusionary reasons and therefore eschew balancing, not that they are justified 
in doing so. For example, Raz does not claim that Jeremy is right in viewing his 
commander’s order as an exclusionary reason, and in refusing to balance the 
reasons for or against the order. Raz only claims that Jeremy (who exhibits 
common behavior) does in fact regard the command as an exclusionary reason 
and does in fact refuse to balance reasons for or against the order.41
35 Id. at 40, 46 (emphasis added).
36
 The latter types of reasons are termed by Raz, “authority-based reasons,” and the former, 
“incapacity based reasons.” Id. at 47-8.
37 Id. at 73.
38 Id. at 142.
39 See infra note 67.
40 Id. at 35,36, 204.
41 Id. at 38.
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2. In forming a second-order reason, one can use general balancing (unless 
there is another, higher-order reason that qualifies balancing at this level also). 
Thus, for example, Jeremy’s commander can decide whether to give the order to 
Jeremy by balancing costs and benefits (i.e. first-order reasons). For Jeremy, 
however, such balancing is blocked, if he treats the command as a valid second-
order reason. In addition, two second-order reasons can conflict in a particular 
case, and when they do, the conflict is resolved by balancing according to 
respective weights.42
3. Having an exclusionary reason does not make decisions easy.  First, as 
mentioned above, a second-order reason may conflict with other second-order 
reasons. In addition, according to Raz, the scope of a second-order reason can be 
affected by “scope-affecting reasons.” For example, in the case of Jeremy, the 
rank of the officer may function as a scope-affecting reason: “Jeremy may assign 
a greater scope to the orders of an officer of a higher rank. There will be fewer 
cases in which he would rely and act on his own judgment when it conflicts with 
an instruction given by a high-ranking officer, [rather than a low-ranking 
officer.]”43
4. The conflict between two first-order reasons is incidental, while the 
conflict between a second-order and a first-order reason is logical. Two first-order 
reasons may conflict in some cases, but in other cases they may not conflict. It all 
depends on the particularities of the case. However, a second-order reason will 
always conflict with the first-order reason it excludes. This is because the 
exclusion of the first-order reason is part of what it means to be that particular 
second-order reason. The first conflict is therefore incidental, while the second is 
necessary and logical.44
42 Id. at 47.
43 Id. at 46-47.
44 Id. at 183.
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B.  Mark Kelman—Balancing and ‘Costs’
We turn now to another essay that disproves the balancing consciousness. 
This essay, unlike Raz’s, is couched within a specific legal context. Mark Kelman 
examines anti-discrimination litigation, specifically Title VII litigation concerning 
discrimination in the workplace, and The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
litigation, and notices two types of claims that are being brought under those 
statutes.45 The first type of claim he terms simple discrimination and the second, 
accommodation.46 A black job applicant that is not hired because the employer 
hates blacks has a claim against simple discrimination.47 A disabled job applicant 
that is not hired because employing him requires costly adjustments to the 
workplace has a claim for accommodation.48
Current doctrine usually treats both these types of claims according to the 
same balancing logic, in which the evils of discrimination are balanced with the 
costs of curbing the discriminatory activity. However, like Raz, Kelman reaches 
the conclusion that one logical type of decision is not enough, and that the two
types of claims call for two types of decision-making methods, only one of which 
is balancing. Why he thinks so is very interesting. Kelman argues that simple 
discrimination claims should not be balanced with other claims because accepting 
45
 Mark Kelman, Market discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833 (2001). Earlier 
essays by Kelman apply a similar distinction. See Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in 
"General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1164-70 (1991); MARK KELMAN & 
GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE, 195-208 (1997).  
46
 The term accommodation is based on its regular meaning in the legal literature. It is, 
however, formalized by Kelman as the discussion bellow will show.
47
 Kelman provides the following formal definition of the norm against simple discrimination:
[E]mpowered market actors (i.e., employers, sellers of goods and services classed as 
‘public accommodations’) are duty-bound to treat those putative plaintiffs with whom they 
deal (job applicants, employees, would-be buyers) no worse than they treat others who are 
equivalent sources of money.
Id. at 835.
48
 The formal definition of the accommodation claim is: “a claim to receive treatment from a 
defendant that disregards some (though not all) differential input costs.” Id. at 836.
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them does not cost anything in terms of other legitimate claims. Accommodation 
claims, on the other hand, do have costs and therefore have to be balanced with 
other claims. This view seems odd and counterintuitive—how could anything be 
costless? However, I believe it is correct, and furthermore that it represents a 
reason for accepting Raz’s model in the area of anti-discrimination law: simple 
discrimination claims are exclusionary claims, while accommodation claims are 
only first-order claims. 
The following will be an attempt to summarize Kelman’s analysis by 
identifying five differences between simple discrimination claims and 
accommodation claims. An understanding of these differences will demonstrate 
that Kelman’s distinctions are similar to Raz’s. Furthermore, I will argue that the 
combination of Raz and Kelman’s frameworks provides a new and improved 
dual-model for balancing.
1. The first difference between the two types of claims is that an 
accommodation claim has a limit—it must be reasonable—while a simple 
discrimination does not have such a limit. The accommodation norm requires 
only reasonable accommodation from employers in the workplace. For example, 
paying for a special elevator for the disabled might be reasonable, but buying an 
extremely costly machine to help a particular disabled worker might not. To every 
accommodation claim, therefore, the employer may answer that such a claim is 
unreasonable, and this answer would have to be evaluated according to the 
particularities of the case. The simple discrimination norm, on the other hand, is 
not limited in the same way. We do not require that employers not discriminate 
against black applicants only when it is not reasonable to do so, or only when the 
particularities of the case allows it. The norm against simple discrimination 
carries with it a much more categorical ban on discrimination, which is not 
subject to the test of reasonability.49
49 Id. at 834-5. For a qualification of this claim see infra notes 56,57 and accompanying text. 
This qualification applies also to the other four differences between simple discrimination and 
accommodation reviewed below.
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2. Secondly, and obviously important for our purposes, an accommodation 
claim involves balancing, while a simple discrimination claim does not. A 
decision to accommodate a disabled person involves weighing the benefit from 
such accommodation versus its costs. Consider a law firm that is asked to provide 
an extremely expensive machine for a lawyer with a rare disability. Such a firm 
may not have enough money left to provide accommodation to another disabled 
lawyer employee, or to provide more leaves for employees with children, or to 
engage in more pro bono work that could benefit third parties, or even any money 
left at all, which would cause the employer to go bankrupt. The accommodation 
claim of the disabled person with the rare disability has to be balanced with all of 
these claims, and in this balancing analysis it might turn out that its cost is too 
high and this would be a reason to deny it. In simple discrimination claims, 
however, we do not typically engage in balancing. We do not weigh the value of a 
black job applicant to be free from discrimination against the cost to the employer 
in not being able to follow his racist inclinations. We also do not weigh the 
societal value of having a society without discrimination versus the societal cost 
in terms of the lost opportunities to discriminate. In simple discrimination cases 
we do not balance.50
3. Why do we not balance in simple discrimination cases? We do not balance 
because we regard the racist inclinations of the employer in such cases as 
illegitimate or harmful motivations that are objects of abolition, while we do not 
so regard the considerations of the employers in accommodation cases. This is the 
50
 Kelman writes:
The ‘simple discrimination’ norm establishes a strong entitlement, what rights theorists 
would consider a side constraint on the conduct of those who would violate the norm…. 
Claims of right by one plaintiff should not be balanced against competing claims by other 
plaintiffs seeking similar treatment…[or against] claims by defendants that it would be 
unduly costly to meet the plaintiff’s claims … [or against] claims by non-participants in 
the suit that they are more worthy recipients of the ‘resources’  the defendant is expected to 
‘expend’.
Id. at 835.
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third difference between simple discrimination and accommodation claims—the 
difference in terms of the legitimacy of the claims.
The interest of the employer in an accommodation case is to save money by 
not spending it on accommodating the disabled employee. It is not illegitimate per 
se and we would not want the employer to refrain from considering it in any 
future cases. The problem may lie not in its illegitimacy, but in the fact that it is 
given too much weight in the case, or, to put it differently, that it should be 
overridden by another more important consideration—the accommodation 
consideration. Simple discrimination cases, however, present a different problem. 
Since the racist employer’s interest in following his racist ideology is illegitimate 
per se, there are no cases in which we would approve of him following them, and 
we would like them abolished altogether. The problem in simple discrimination 
cases does not lie in the fact that a consideration is given too much weight, or that 
it is overridden by another consideration, but in the fact that it is illegitimate.51
4. The fourth difference between Kelman’s two types of anti-discrimination 
claims is that simple discrimination claims do not have costs, while 
accommodation claims do. How so? Satisfying an accommodation claim has a
cost in terms of real social resources. The employer in the above example has to 
spend money on buying the special machine, and this in turn means that he would 
not be able to spend it on something else. Therefore, not all accommodation 
claims can be met, since they would necessarily conflict: paying for the special 
machine, means not paying for other machines.52 Simple discrimination claims, 
however, have no social cost in terms of real social resources. There is no cost 
involved in abolishing simple discrimination of the kind of not hiring a lawyer 
51
 Kelman writes:
The non-accommodation defendant… attempts to retain (or save) real social resources… 
[that] are public and objective, and the desire to expend them completely socially 
legitimate.…On the other hand, the simple discriminator gains utility from acting on tastes 
that are ordinarily imperfectly fungible, private/subjective, and arguably illegitimate.
Id. at 854.
52
 “[T]hose seeking accommodation are making claims on real social resources that compete 
with all other social resource claimants; all such claims cannot be met.” Id. at 837.
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because she is black (unless one considers depriving people of opportunities to 
apply a racist ideology to be a cost.53) Therefore, all claims of simple 
discrimination can be met and they would not conflict with each other: We can 
satisfy the claims against simple discrimination of Jews and against simple 
discrimination of blacks and against simple discrimination of women, and those 
claims would not conflict.54
5. Finally, the fifth difference, which is an outgrowth of the fourth difference, 
concerns the economic attributes of the two types of claims. Since 
accommodation claims have costs, they can be described as distributive claims, or 
claims for a share in a common budget—be it the employer’s budget, or the 
state’s budget if the cost is born by the state. They can also be described as policy 
arguments for the allocation of money for an important goal, namely, integrating 
disabled people into society, or, improving their quality of life. Such claims 
compete in a zero-sum game with other valid claims over limited resources. 
However, simple discrimination claims are not distributive claims and they do not 
compete with other claims in a zero-sum game. They are not policy arguments for 
spending money. They are what are typically termed rights claims.55
As with Raz’s scheme, some clarifications are in order. I will consider two 
such clarifications. First, Kelman does not argue that the norm against simple 
discrimination is absolute, in the sense that no consideration could ever be 
balanced with it. His claim is only that, once the decision has been made that 
discrimination is not allowed, a claim against simple discrimination does not 
regularly have to stand to the balance.56 Secondly, Kelman needs to address the 
53
 Such cost would be a “private” or “subjective” cost, but not a “public” cost, since racist 
ideology is publicly perceived as illegitimate. See id., passage quoted in note 51, supra.
54 See id. at 836.
55
 “The accommodation [claim is a] distributive claim … rather than a right.” Id. at 837.
56
 This clarification is actually two clarifications. First, that balancing is allowed in the stage of 
formulating the right against simple discrimination. (Kelamn writes:
The ‘right’ [against simple discrimination] is not, in my view, ‘absolute’ in its formation or 
initial articulation. That is to say, we cannot ascertain whether or not a party ought to have 
the right to be free from simple discrimination without engaging in conventional policy 
24 THE DUAL MODEL OF BALANCING
issue of customers’ preferences, which seems to show that avoiding simple 
discrimination does have a cost after all (e.g., if the employer would hire the black 
person, she would loose customers.) Kelman addresses this issue through the idea 
of vicarious simple discrimination: the customers are the ones engaged in simple 
discrimination. The employer is just the middleman between the customers and 
the employee.57
balancing, weighing the interests of potential defendants against those of rights claimants. 
But once that policy balancing is done, we establish a scheme of rights that does not 
demand case-by- case balancing.
Id. at 835-6. Compare with Raz’s clarification, according to which balancing is possible at the level 
of forming the second-order reason. Supra note 42 and accompanying text,) and secondly, that 
balancing a claim against simple discrimination is allowed under extreme circumstances, but not on 
a regular basis. (Kelamn writes:
In the anti-discrimination context, for instance, one supposes that an employer might 
temporarily segregate workers in an otherwise impermissible fashion to avert severe racial 
violence, if no less rights-violative alternative were available… What differentiates this 
cost-benefit calculation from a typical cost-benefit calculation is simply that the defendant 
must prove that the costs of observing the conventional right in these contexts far outweigh 
the benefits before he is immunized from the duty to observe the right.  It is also possible 
to argue that parties can invoke justification defenses only when trying to prevent harms 
that are in some fashion incommensurate with the benefits we expect from following 
ordinary practices… [I]n either case, claims of simple discrimination will not be routinely 
subject to balancing tests.
Id. at 836, note 7).
57
 Kelman wirtes:
I have long claimed that customer preference cases are… simple discrimination cases. The 
employer, in essence, acts as an agent of customers.  (The ‘real’ employer of a shoe 
salesman is the shoe store customer; the shoe store manager simply intermediates between 
customers and salesman.)  An employer would, in essence, manifest the customers’ 
impermissible market-irrationality if she were able to say that she refused to hire those that 
customers would not deal with, not because of her own market- irrationality, but because 
profits would decline if she hired an unpopular salesperson.
Id. at 848.
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C. The Dual Model of Balancing—Raz and Kelman Combined
I propose that the five differences between simple discrimination claims and 
accommodation claims according to Kelman’s analysis correlate with Raz’s two 
orders of reasons. Recall that Raz defined a second-order/exclusionary 
consideration as “any reason to… refrain from acting for a reason.”58 Kelman’s 
analysis shows that a claim of simple discrimination, or the anti-discrimination 
norm, functions just like an exclusionary consideration: it is a reason to exclude 
other reasons—discriminatory reasons, such as the interest in racial separation—
from being acted upon in the workplace. Put differently, the anti-discrimination 
norm can be seen as a second-order promise not to take into account certain first-
order considerations—i.e. discriminatory considerations—in making decisions in 
the workplace.59 The accommodation claim, however, functions only as a first-
order consideration. It is not a second-order consideration of a higher level, which 
makes some lower level reasons totally excluded. Rather, it is a regular reason 
that adds to the total balance of reasons in the case. It is one more consideration to 
be balanced with other valid considerations of the same level within the sphere of 
the workplace, according to its weight under the circumstances.60
However, Kelman’s analysis does not merely follow Raz’s analysis. It also 
provides new and rich insight into Raz’s model, so that the two frameworks 
combined form an improved and powerful tool for analyzing balancing, which I 
call the dual model. Raz contributes the distinction between the two levels of 
reasons, while Kelman complements this description by enumerating the five 
58 RAZ, supra note 10, at 39.
59
 This promise would be a promise of the American society as a whole, instead of a promise of 
single person, as in Raz’s example of Colin’s promise.
60
 Another feature of the Razian analysis also applies to Kelman’s analysis. The claims of the 
employer and of the employee conflict logically in simple discrimination (they would always 
conflict since it is always the case that the wish for racial separation conflicts with the norm against 
simple discrimination), while they only incidentally conflict in accommodation cases (it is not 
always the case that the wish to save money conflicts with the accommodation norm. This will only 
happen if the wish to save money results in not giving enough money for accommodation.)
26 THE DUAL MODEL OF BALANCING
differences between simple discrimination and accommodation cases as well as 
providing the vocabulary of costs, distribution and allocation of resources.
Kelman’s analysis reveals that first-order reasons are actually appeals for the 
allocation of resources to an important goal. As appeals for resources, first-order 
reasons always have costs, and therefore always have to compete, at least in 
principle, with all other valid (first-order) claims for the same resources. Thus, 
they should be properly considered to be budgetary claims—claims which are, by 
nature, subject to reasonability and to balancing.  But, continues Kelman’s 
analysis, not all claims are budgetary claims for resources. Some claims rely on 
an earlier commitment to disregard other claims as illegitimate, or regard their 
abolition as costless. These are second-order reasons. Kelman’s analysis, 
therefore, reveals both that first-order reasons are budgetary claims that have a 
cost, and also that second-order reasons are non-budgetary reasons, which are, by 
definition, cost free. 
To demonstrate the combination of the two analytical schemes, consider once 
again Raz’s example of Colin61 analyzed in Kelman’s terms. All the first-order 
considerations for and against sending Colin’s son to the expensive school had 
costs. They all necessarily came one at the expense of the other in a zero sum
game and were in fact claims for resources. For example, sending Colin’s son to 
an expensive school would come at the expense of writing Colin’s novel, because 
they both cost money and Colin has a limited amount of money. Similarly, 
Colin’s son’s interest in attending the expensive school can be described as a 
claim for a share in Colin’s budget, or as a claim for the allocation of Colin’s 
recourses, or as a claim that Colin accommodate his son’s needs. 
However, Colin’s second-order reason—his promise to consider only his 
son’s interests in making decisions regarding his son’s education—is not a claim 
for resources. In fact it is not a claim at all, but a reason to exclude some other 
claims, namely those claims that do not relate to his son’s interests, from being 
considered, or from being regarded as valid claims or costs. The promise itself is 
61 Supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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therefore not reliant on limited resources, and accepting it does not cost anything. 
Rather, once the promise is in place, denying those considerations that are 
excluded by the promise is costless, since Colin has already decided that they 
should be disregarded.62
The following table summarizes the dual model distinction between first-
order and second-order consideration, combining the schemes of Raz and 
Kelman.
Table 1: First-Order and Second-Order Considerations—Raz and Kelman Combined
First-order considerations Second-order/exclusionary considerations
1 Give reasons for or against a course of 
action.
Give reasons to exclude other reasons from being 
considered in making a decision for or against a 
course of action
2 Constitute claims for the allocation of 
societal resources. 
Constitute claims to abolish illegitimate or invalid 
considerations.
4 Subject to balancing with other claims 
for resources, come at the expense of 
such other claims, compete with them 
over limited resources, not all claims 
can be met.
Not subject to balancing, not competing for 
resources, all claims can be met.
5 Distributive. Resemble claims for a 
share in a budget.
Not distributive. Resemble claims that a certain 
consideration should not be given any share in the 
budget, because it is invalid. 
6 Conflict incidentally with other first-
order reasons.
Conflict logically with the first-order reasons they 
exclude.
Before moving on to assessing the implications of the dual model, I would 
like to address a possible objection to the dual model. According to this objection, 
even a second-order/exclusionary consideration will have to be balanced at some 
point, if the costs of abiding by it are too high, or its consequences too extreme. If 
the costs of abiding by a promise, or a rule, or even the anti-discrimination norm, 
are too high, an exception to them will be found, and they will be balanced with 
62 See also infra notes 63 and 64 and accompanying text .
28 THE DUAL MODEL OF BALANCING
the first-order consideration that they are supposed to exclude. This goes to show 
that there is no real distinction between first-order and second-order 
considerations.
There are three possible replies to this objection. For purposes of brevity I 
only sketch these replies briefly, leaving their full elaboration to another 
opportunity. The first reply is that second-order/exclusionary considerations 
include within them also their exceptions. For example, the idea that a promise is 
a second-order/exclusionary consideration does not require absolute obedience to 
the promise. It requires only that those exceptions to the promise that are allowed 
would be found in the practice of promising itself.63 The second reply is that, 
although in some extreme circumstances we might allow the balancing of a 
second-order/exclusionary consideration, under regular circumstances we would 
not allow such balancing. Promises and norms, such as the norm against simple 
discrimination, are second-order considerations since we do not regularly balance 
them with other considerations.64 Finally, the third reply is that, while balancing a 
63
 John Rawls makes a similar argument in one of his early essays: 
Is this [claiming that a promise should not be balanced] to say that in particular cases one 
cannot deliberate whether or not to keep one’s promise? Of course not. But to do so is to 
deliberate whether the various excuses, exceptions and defenses which are understood, and 
which constitute an important part of the practice, apply to one’s own case. Various 
defenses for not keeping one’s promise are allowed… there may be a defense that the 
consequences of keeping one’s promise would have been extremely severe… But this sort 
of defense, allowed by the practice, must not be confused with the general option to weigh 
each particular case on utilitarian grounds. 
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 3 (1955), reprinted in FREDERICK 
A. OLAFSON (ED.), SOCIETY, LAW, AND MORALITY 420 (1961), at 428-29. Compare with the 
following distinction between internal and external constitutional interpretation: “[T]he ‘exception’ 
may best be understood not as resulting from a balance but as resting upon a principle internal to the 
constitutional provision… That is, where the justification for, or basis of, the right no longer applies, 
the right should not be recognized. This ‘internal’ argument is quite distinct from… the ‘external’ 
evaluation of costs that balancing entails.” Aleinikoff, supra note 6 at 1000.
64
 Consider the following example by Aleinikoff:
I promise to pick you up at the train station at noon. At 11:55 a.m., a friend breaks a leg 
and needs to be taken to the hospital. If I take her, I won't get to the station until 12:30 p.m. 
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second-order/exclusionary consideration is possible, it would manifest a change 
in the role of the agent engaged in balancing. The balancer’s role would change 
from that of an agent operating under the second-order norm, to that of an agent 
engaged in changing or forming the second-order norm. The distinction between 
the two kinds of considerations remains valid.65 These three replies are 
interrelated, however, for the purposes of this Article, any one of them should 
suffice.66
Of course, I go to the hospital (even though I have no way of getting a message to you). 
One could say that implicit in my promise to pick you up is the possibility that some 
pressing need will command my attention at exactly the time the train arrives. But I won't 
even go that far. I will assume that I agreed to get you come hell or high water and that I 
have decided to break the promise because of the unforeseen circumstance—because a 
broken leg ‘outweighs’ a half-hour wait at the train station. This emergency situation does 
not suggest that I would have considered leaving you to watch the trains go by for any 
reason. I would not have calculated costs and benefits if someone else asked me to lunch, 
if there were a television show on at noon that I wanted to watch, or if I needed just thirty 
more minutes to develop a coherent theory of equal protection law.
Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 1000 n. 317. See supra note 56 (Kelman’s sec ond clarification) for 
the same argument concerning balancing the norm against simple discrimination.
65 Compare with the following by Rawls:
[I]f one holds an office defined by a practice then questions regarding one’s actions in this 
office are settled by reference to the rules which define the practice. If one seeks to 
question these rules, then one’s office undergoes a fundamental change: one assumes the 
office of one empowered to change and criticize the rules, or the office of a reformer.
Rawls, supra note 63 at 433.
66
 There is actually a forth reply to the objection to the dual model, which follows a Pragmatist 
line of justification. According to this reply, the dual model is valid, because it ‘works’. That is, it 
provides a helpful set of tools in analyzing practical problems, and gives us a richer picture of 
practical problems than its balancing consciousness alternative. The test for this answer would be in 
the success of the application of the dual model to practical legal problems, which would be the aim 
of the rest of the Article.
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D. The Implications of the Dual Model 
What are the implications of this new dual model for balancing? Why have I 
taken the reader through all of Kelamn’s and Raz’s fine analytical distinctions? If 
the analysis is correct, its implications for balancing, both in terms of rejecting the 
balancing consciousness, and in terms of understanding the true nature of 
balancing, are quite far-reaching. 
The first implication of the dual model is the rejection of both of the 
supporting arguments of the balancing consciousness. The reducibility argument 
is repudiated since not every decision is reducible to balancing. Every decision is 
reducible to balancing only if we were to assume a “flat” world, in which all 
considerations are first-order considerations. However, as Raz and Kelman 
demonstrate, many important considerations (rules, promises, and norms, such as 
the norm against simple discrimination) function as considerations of a different 
level. They are second-order considerations, and they should not be balanced with 
first-order considerations.67
The anti-absolutist argument is also partially repudiated by the dual model. 
This is an especially important point, since the anti-absolutist argument is an 
67
 To the list of second-order considerations that defy a “flat” view of practical reason, one can 
also add values, and valuations (See Nussbaum, supra note 22; Sunstein , supra note 6; Richardson, 
supra note 22; Anderson, supra note 25. (all criticizing  the law and economic movement by 
stressing the idea that certain values and valuations are incommensurable and that there must be a 
distinction between levels and types of values and valuations,)) and also desires (See Harry G. 
Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in his THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE 
CARE ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 11 (1988) (arguing that our desires are of two orders, first-
order and second-order, and that this hierarchy between our desires is what makes us human, and 
accounts for us having free will.)) Finally, Aurel Kolnai argues against a “flattened” view of morals, 
criticizing “modern English-speaking” philosophers of the utilitarian school that they “reduce all 
value to ‘needs’ or ‘desires’ and their different ‘intensities’ and in their turn, I venture say, seek 
preposterously to evade the very concept or Hierarchy... They postulate a flattened world from 
which the presence of Verticality is all but wholly excluded” Aurel Kolnai, The Concept of 
Hierarchy, in his ETHICS, VALUE AND REALITY: SELECTED PAPERS OF AUREL KOLNAI  165 (1978).
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argument that “balancers” place heavy reliance on.68 The anti-absolutist argument 
holds that balancing is always inevitable since no consideration can be given 
immunity from balancing. Giving any consideration immunity from balancing 
means that all one’s resources would have to be given to this one “unbalanceable” 
or “absolute” consideration. Kelman’s framework combined with Raz’s shows 
that this kind of argument can hold only with regard to first-order considerations 
and not with regard to second-order considerations. Only first-order 
considerations have costs and thereby compete with other first-order 
considerations over limited resources. Only for a first-order consideration would 
it therefore be true that not balancing it with other first-order considerations 
would make it absolute since it would mean diverting unlimited resources for its 
fulfillment.
However, second-order considerations do not have costs and do not come at 
the expense of other considerations. They do not compete in a zero-sum game,
they are not affected by the fact that there are limited societal resources, and they 
can all be met. This is so because they are considerations for the exclusion of 
interests deemed altogether illegitimate and irrelevant in a particular case. As such 
they do not cost anything but rather express an earlier decision on costs. 
The anti-absolutist argument is therefore misplaced with regard to an entire 
category of practical problems. As with the reducibility argument, it can hold only 
at the expense of limiting its scope. The supporting ideologies and arguments for 
the balancing consciousness—utilitarianism, pragmatism, economic analysis, and 
pluralism—are therefore misplaced with regard to second-order conflicts. When 
applied to second-order conflicts they simply misrepresent them, as if they were 
first-order conflicts.69
There is another implication of the dual model, which is just as important as 
the first. This implication relates to the nature of balancing itself. Balancing 
conflicts, the dual model tells us, have a specific character. They are budgetary 
conflicts; conflicts over limited resources; conflicts of considerations of the same 
68 See, e.g., comment in text accompanying note 20 supra.
69 See infra Part V.B documenting this distortion in constitutional law.
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level, varying in weight but not in kind. We are thus provided with a rudimentary 
test for the appropriateness of balancing. In each case, we should ask ourselves, 
what is the nature of the conflicting considerations, and what is the nature of the 
conflict? Is this a conflict over resources? Can each claim be properly interpreted 
as a claim for the allocation of funds to a worthy cause, subject to reasonability? 
Or, can we identify one of the considerations as an exclusionary reason—a reason 
to reject some other reasons for action—and the conflict as a second-order 
conflict of considerations from different levels? Balancing would be appropriate 
only in the first kind of conflict.
III. THE DUAL MODEL APPLIED TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Once the dual model is outlined and the balancing consciousness refuted, the 
next step is to apply it to constitutional law. This will be the task of this Part.
Constitutional conflicts traditionally involve a conflict between a 
constitutionally protected right and a governmental or public interest. Following 
the dual model, we must ask ourselves therefore in each case of constitutional 
conflict—what kind of conflict is this? Can it be properly interpreted as a first-
order conflict over resources? Can both claims in the conflict—the constitutional 
rights claim and the governmental interest claim—be properly interpreted as two 
legitimate first-order claims fighting over a limited budget? Or, does one of the 
claims (the constitutional rights claim, presumably) function as a second-
order/exclusionary reason, which totally excludes the other claim? Balancing is 
appropriate only in the first case. It should be rejected in the second.
This Part demonstrates that constitutional cases present both types of 
conflicts. That is, some constitutional cases involve first-order conflicts, and 
others involve second-order conflicts. Furthermore, for each particular right one 
must differentiate between cases in which it appears as a first-order consideration, 
and cases in which it appears as a second-order consideration. The discussion 
focuses first on free speech, distinguishing first-order free speech claims from 
second-order free speech claims. The discussion then moves on to analyze two 
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other constitutional areas according to the dual model—dormant commerce clause 
and equal protection—and refers to some other possible applications of the dual 
model in constitutional law.
A. Free Speech First-Order Claims
Consider a series of free speech cases in the 1940s that involved indirect 
limitations on speech and the regulation of time, place and manner of speech. In 
these cases, a governmental interest that was unrelated to the content of speech 
was the basis of regulation that imposed burdens on speech. For example, in 
Schneider v. State,70 a governmental interest in keeping the streets of a city clean 
was the basis of a regulation that banned the distribution of handbills in the 
streets. This ban, although not directed at the content of speech, was an indirect
burden on speech in that it restricted the place and the manner in which handbills 
could be distributed.
Similarly in Kovacs v. Cooper,71 a governmental interest in maintaining quiet 
in the streets of a city was the basis of a regulation that restricted the operation of 
sound-trucks (trucks equipped with loudspeakers that were used to promote 
mayoral candidates). As in Schneider, this ban, although not directed at speech, 
resulted in an indirect burden on speech and a restriction on the time, place, and 
manner of speech by limiting the communication of ideas to certain designated 
uses. Finally, in Cantwell v. Connecticut 72 the governmental interest in 
maintaining the privacy of the home and in protecting homeowners from fraud led 
to a regulation that required special permits for door-to-door solicitation by a 
religious group thus limiting the group’s ability to spread its message.
In all of these cases the Court applied balancing. The Court balanced the 
governmental interest with the interest in free speech, which is protected by the 
First Amendment. The balancing exercise determined which interest outweighed 
70
 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
71
 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
72
 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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the other, and whether the regulation reflected the proper balance between the 
two. Thus, in Schneider, the Court overturned the regulation banning the 
distribution of handbills, because it reflected an improper balance between two 
interests. The interest of free speech, the Court determined, outweighed the 
interest of street cleanliness.73 A similar decision was made in Cantwell with 
regard to the interest in maintaining the privacy of the home.74 In Kovacs, on the 
other hand, the regulation that banned speech from sound-trucks in the interest of 
maintaining quiet was found appropriate by the Court.
However, for our purposes, the importance of these cases is not in the 
particular balance struck in each one of them, but rather in the features that made 
them amenable to balancing in the first place—i.e., the fact that the free speech 
claims in all of these cases were first-order claims, and the conflict a first-order 
conflict.
Consider the conflict between the government’s interest and the right to free 
speech in Schneider.75 In this case, the interest of keeping streets clean conflicted 
with the interest of allowing speech in the form of handbills. This conflict has all 
the features of a first-order conflict between two first-order reasons as described 
by Raz. The cleanliness interest and the free speech interest are both valid 
interests applicable to the case. They conflict because of the special circumstances 
of the case, i.e., the fact that distributing handbills causes litter. And therefore a 
decision has to be made as to which is a more important or weighty consideration 
73
 In Schneider, Justice Roberts writes: 
We are of opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is 
insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street 
from handing literature to one willing to receive it…The public convenience in respect of 
cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of the police power which invades the 
free communication of information and opinion secured by the Constitution.
308 U.S., at 162-63. (Roberts, J. writing for the Court)
74
 The Court determined that the regulation was not “narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed 
evil” and laid a “forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution.” 310 
U.S., at 307.
75
 See, supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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in the case. In addition, choosing one interest will inevitably be at the expense of 
the other interests. In Schneider, the Court admitted that the city would have to 
put up with some additional litter in order that free speech be adequately 
protected.76
Consider now the analysis of the conflict in Schneider in terms of a claim for 
accommodation following Kelman’s analysis. The free speech claim of the 
petitioners in Schneider can be regarded as a claim for the accommodation of 
speech. That is, they ask that the municipality of their city allocate resources so 
that they can have more speech—the municipality should bear the costs of 
cleaning the litter caused by the handbills so that the plaintiffs can express their 
messages. As such, the petitioners’ claim in Schneider was not an absolute claim. 
It had to be reasonable. Hypothetically, if the petitioners’ speech had created an 
abundance of litter that brought on exorbitant cleaning costs, the Court would not 
have accepted the petitioners’ claim. The entire conflict can therefore be 
characterized as a budgetary conflict: both claims—the free speech claim and the 
cleanliness interest claim77—are valid claims that cost money. But, since there is a 
limited amount of money, a certain distributive decision has to be made, and this 
means balancing. By deciding for the petitioners, the Court indicated that in the 
special circumstances of that case it was reasonable to expect the municipality to 
pay for the accommodation of speech, thus stating that the way the city balanced 
the interests was unreasonable.
B. Free Speech Second-Order Claims
The previous analysis showed that certain free speech cases presented free 
speech as a typical first-order consideration. However, this description does not 
reflect all cases of free speech. Some of the most celebrated early cases of free 
76
 “Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an 
indirect consequence of such distribution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of 
speech and press.” 308 U.S., at 162.
77
 The city’s competing valid interest in the case was the interest in saving money, or the 
interest in spending its limited budget on other valid causes.
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speech involved a free speech claim of a different nature. I am referring to cases 
that involved what is known as a direct impact on speech, or attempts to control 
the content of speech—i.e., to suppress some content or to allow only some 
content. This famous line of cases includes Abrams v. United States,78 Gitlow v. 
New York,79 and Whitney v. California,80 in which government attempted to 
suppress anti-war and pro-socialist content of speech. Another line of free speech 
cases involved governmental attempts to suppress pro-communist content of 
speech in the 1950s and early 1960s.81 Direct regulation of content was also 
involved in cases such as Cohen v. California,82 and Tinker v. Des Moines School 
District83 concerning anti-Vietnam -War content of speech. In the Flag-
Desecration cases,84 the Court dealt with regulations pertaining to the suppression 
of messages contemptuous of the American flag. Recent examples of direct 
impact on speech exist as well.85
 What distinguishes these cases from the line of cases discussed in the 
previous section? They involve free speech as a second-order claim, and a 
78
 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
79
 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
80
  274 U.S. 357(1927).
81 See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Konigsberg v. State 
Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control 
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
82
 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
83
 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
84
 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397 (1989) and United States v 
Eichman, 496 US 310 (1990).
85
 To the list of cases involving direct impact on speech one can add also, R.A.V v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). See Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: 
R.A.V. v St. Paul, Rust v Sullivan, and the Problem of Content- Based Underinclusion, 1992 S. CT. 
REV. 29, and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). For additional cases 
see Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996), at 427-8 n. 43, 45.
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second-order conflict between the free speech norm and the governmental 
interest. Consequently they do not involve balancing.
In Abrams,86 for example, the free speech interest conflicted with the 
government’s interest in protecting against the harmful effects of anti-war 
opinions. Such a conflict (as interpreted by Holmes’ famous dissent) has all the 
characteristics of a conflict between a second-order reason and a first-order 
reason. The free speech interest and the government’s interest are not two valid 
interests that differ merely in their weight. Rather, the free speech interest is a 
second-order/exclusionary reason that totally excludes the government’s interest 
in the case. Holmes interpreted the free speech norm as providing that “the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas [rather than by 
allowing] persecution for the expression of opinions”87 Such a free speech norm 
makes the government’s interest in protecting against anti-war opinions totally 
invalid, rather than a consideration to be balanced with free speech.88 The free 
speech interest is a (second-order) reason for the government not to act on the 
(first-order) reason that it disagrees with the defendants’ creed. The objection to 
the petitioner’s creed is not a consideration that is balanced with the consideration 
of free speech. Rather, according to Holmes, “no one has a right even to consider 
[the petitioner’s creed] in dealing with the charges before the court.”89 Such 
consideration is therefore totally excluded as irrelevant to the case.
Consider now the analysis of the direct impact cases in terms of Kelman’s 
analysis of claims against simple discrimination. Holmes’ dissent in Abrams can 
be regarded as a repudiation of the discrimination of speech because of its anti-
war content, (based on the idea that all opinions must have the opportunity to 
86 Supra note 78.
87 Id. at 630.
88 Compare with the following from Justice Black: “The idea of ‘balancing away’ First 
Amendment freedoms appears to me to be wholly inconsistent with the view strongly espoused by 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis, that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market.” Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 81 S. Ct. 997, 1013 
(1961) (Justice Black dissenting).
89
 250 U.S., at 629-30.
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compete equally in the free market of ideas). The free speech principle, therefore, 
operates in Holmes’ dissent as an anti-discrimination principle that absolutely 
forbids, rather than balances, a discriminatory motive against speech. And the free 
speech claim functions as a claim for abolishing the discriminatory behavior 
against speech, rather than as a claim for the allocation of resources for speech in 
order to accommodate the need for more speech. 
The same analysis is true for the other cases of direct infringement of speech. 
If a certain law suppresses (either in its terms or in its application) only those acts 
of speech that express a communist point of view, as in the Cold War cases, this 
law is discriminating against a communist point of view.90 And if a law favors 
only the messages that are conveyed by the American flag, as in the flag burning 
cases, it discriminates in favor of this particular content of speech.91 The free 
speech anti-discrimination norm in these cases means the total exclusion of the 
interest behind the discrimination of the speech, rather than balancing it with the 
interest of free speech.
Direct impact on speech cases, such as Abrams, are therefore inappropriate 
subjects of balancing because they share the features of second-order conflicts as 
identified by the dual model. In cases of direct impact on speech, free speech is a 
90
 Some of these cases involved regulation that was specifically addressed to the content of 
speech (E.g., Dennis involved the Smith Act of 1946 that made it a crime “… to print, publish, edit, 
issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display any written or printed matter advocating, 
advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any 
government in the United States by force or violence.” And Douds involved the Labor-Management 
Relations Act of 1947 that specifically targeted a political point of view by requiring officials of 
unions who wished to belong to the National Labor Relations Board to take oaths that they did not 
belong to the Communist Party. See cases cited supra in notes 78 and 81,) while other cases 
involved a regulation that was facially neutral with regard to the content of speech, but was applied 
in a manner that singled out speech because of a specific content (for a comprehensive review see 
Kagan, supra note 85, at 456-472).
91 See John H. Ely, Flag Desecration:  A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1501, 1506-7 (1975) (arguing that the 
anti-flag-burning regulations improperly “single out one set of messages, namely the set of 
messages conveyed by the American flag, for protection.”) 
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second-order consideration—a consideration of a higher level that excludes other 
reasons for action, rather than being balanced with them. 
In conclusion, the application of the dual model to free speech cases showed 
that free speech is not one thing but two. In some cases free speech is a first-order 
consideration, which can be termed the free speech interest. In other cases it is a 
second-order consideration, which can be termed the free speech right.92 Each of 
these two types of cases follows a different type of logic—the first a balancing 
logic, and the second an exclusionary logic.
Did the Court follow this distinction? Did it balance only in first-order 
conflicts and exclude in second-order conflicts? While traces of this distinction 
are clearly evident in Court opinions of both types,93 and sometimes even 
explicitly announced,94 the general rhetoric in modern constitutional law is a 
balancing consciousness rhetoric that distorts this distinction.95 That is, both cases 
are treated similarly; the solution to any conflict between free speech and a 
governmental interest is balancing.96
92 Cf. Pildes, supra note 6, at 724 (1994) (“Rights are the means of defining the reasons for 
state action that are appropriate in a particular sphere.”) 
93 See above passages from Schneider and Abrams.
94 See the following by Jusice Haraln: “[Balancing is applicable only to] general regulatory 
statues, not intended to control the content of speech, but incidentally limiting its unfettered 
exercise.” Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961) (Harlan, J. writing for the Court)
95 See, e.g., the following quote from Chief Justice Rehnquist: “We cannot know for certain the 
sort of issues with which the Court will grapple in the third century of its existence. But there is no 
reason to doubt that it will continue as a vital and uniquely American institutional participant in the 
everlasting search of civilized society for the proper balancing between liberty and authority, 
between the state and the individual” W. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT--HOW IT WAS, HOW IT 
IS 319 (1987).
96
 Professor Tushnet conveys this impression when he writes in 1985 that “a recent symposium 
on First Amendment theory is pervaded by comments that the balancing debate is over and that 
everyone knows that free speech law must be developed through the use of balancing”. Mark V. 
Tushnet, Anti Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502, 1531 (1985).
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Before discussing how this came about, and what its implications are, let us 
consider further evidence with regard to the application of the dual model to other 
constitutional rights.
C. Dormant Commerce Clause and Equal Protection
This section will consider two further applications of the dual model to 
constitutional law and refer to some other possible applications. That is, it will 
show that several other constitutional rights have a dual aspect that has to be 
distinguished with regard to balancing. Such rights can generate either first-order 
claims for the allocation of resources to the right, subject to balancing, or second-
order claims for the abolition of illegitimate governmental objectives, not subject 
to balancing. 
1. The first area of constitutional law to be considered here is commerce 
clause jurisprudence. The dual model identifies the following two levels of 
commerce clause considerations. There is a first-order commerce clause 
consideration (that can be termed the commerce clause interest,) and there is a 
second-order commerce clause consideration (that can be termed the commerce 
clause right). The first-order commerce clause interest is the interest in having 
free commerce across state lines (it can be held either by a private commercial 
actor who wishes not to have her commerce burdened, or by Congress as a 
national interest in having free movement of goods between states).97 The second-
order commerce clause right is the right not to have trade restricted due to 
protectionist state motives. In other words, it is the right not to have trade 
restricted because of a state’s wish to prefer local economic actors over foreign 
economic actors.98
97 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1103-4 (1986).
98
 Donald Regan defines a protectionist purpose as “the purpose of improving the competitive 
position of local (in-state) economic actors, just because they are local, vis-à-vis their foreign 
(…mean[ing]… out-of-state) competitors.” Regan, supra note 97, at 1094-95. 
41 THE DUAL MODEL OF BALANCING
The interest of free commerce along state lines is a reason to act in the 
furtherance of a certain good (free interstate commerce) to the extent possible 
under the circumstances. It is limited by its nature, and subject to balancing with 
other valid interests. One cannot avoid having some limitations on trade across 
state lines, and abolishing such limitations necessarily comes at the expense of 
other important interests, such as preventing illegal smuggling, collecting taxes, 
and so on. It therefore functions as a first-order consideration only. However, the 
right against protectionist motives is a reason to totally exclude certain other 
reasons for action (protectionist reasons). The right against protectionist motives 
is not restricted in the same way as the interest in free interstate commerce. It is 
not balanced with, but rather totally excludes, those motives for governmental 
action that are based on protectionism. It therefore functions as a second-
order/exclusionary right.
These two types of commerce clause considerations generate first-order 
commerce clause conflicts and second-order commerce clause conflicts. First-
order commerce clause cases are cases involving a conflict between the (first-
order) interest of free interstate commerce and another (first-order) interest. An 
example would be Southern Pacific Company Co. v. Arizona.99 This case 
involved a law limiting the length of trains in order to avoid accidents associated 
with long trains. The law conflicted with the interest of free interstate commerce, 
because it imposed high costs on railroad companies operating trains that crossed 
state lines. Both the national interest of free interstate commerce and the interest 
in preventing accidents functioned as first-order interests in the case. They were
both valid claims for the promotion of a certain good as much as possible under 
the circumstances. They both had costs in terms of other valid claims, and they 
incidentally conflicted in the case. The case was therefore a balancing case and 
the Court balanced the two considerations.100
99
 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
100
 Justice Stone used balancing writing for the Court that the effect of the regulation was not 
enough to “outweigh the protection of the interest  [of interstate commerce] safeguarded by the 
commerce clause.” Id., at 770.
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Second-order commerce clause cases are cases involving the second-
order/exclusionary anti-protectionist principle conflicting with the first-
order/excluded interest in favoring local commercial actors over out-of-state 
commercial actors. Such a conflict would be a logical conflict, rather than an 
incidental conflict of costs and would be resolved by excluding the protectionist 
interest altogether, rather than by balancing. Arguably, many commerce clause 
cases are such cases.101 An example is Hunt v. Washington State Apple 
Advertising Commission102 in which a North Carolina statute forbade the use of 
certain grades of apples that Washington State apple growers were famous for. 
The Court’s opinion reads like an accusation that this law was motivated by an 
illegitimate protectionist motive, and it invalidates the motive.103
2. The second area of constitutional law to be considered here is the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, and the constitutional principle 
of equality. The constitutional principle of equality can also be regarded as 
espousing two kinds of considerations: a first-order consideration in having as 
much equality in society as possible under the circumstances (the equality 
interest) and a second -order/exclusionary principle that totally excludes, rather 
than balances, discriminatory motives (the equality right). 
The equality interest has several well-known manifestations in equal 
protection theory. It is sometimes referred to as the principle of substantive 
equality, and it includes the principles of accommodation, discussed in length 
earlier, and also the principle of affirmative action.104 Both the principle of 
101 See Regan, supra note 97, at 1092: “in the central area of dormant commerce clause 
jurisprudence… the Court has been concerned exclusively with preventing states from engaging in 
purposeful economic protectionism.”   
102
 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
103 See Regan, supra note 97, at 1221-28, interpreting the Court’s rhetoric as an anti-
protectionist rhetoric. “The underlying concern with suppressing protectionism is perfectly visible to 
whoever will look.”
104 See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, Equality and Free Speech: The Case Against Substantive 
Equality, 82 IOWA L. REV. 645 (1997) (describing interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
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accommodation and the principle of affirmative action manifest the wish to 
promote equality in society among its different social groups. Both principles are, 
however, limited in nature, since they require social resources for their 
implementation, and since they would necessarily conflict with other valid social 
interests. The interest in promoting equality between black and white people, 
which stands behind affirmative action programs, might for example, conflict 
with the interest in meritocracy in education.105 The interest in accommodation, 
discussed at length in Part II, may conflict with other societal interests that require 
resources.106
The second-order/exclusionary right against discrimination however, is not 
limited in the same way. The right against discriminatory motives is a reason to 
totally exclude discriminatory reasons for action. As such, it is not balanced with, 
but rather totally excludes, those motives for governmental action that are based 
on discrimination. 
These two manifestations of the equality principle generate first-order equal 
protection cases and second-order equal protection cases. First-order equal 
protection cases are cases involving a conflict between the first-order interest of 
accommodation, or of affirmative action, and a governmental first-order interest. 
An example would be University of California v. Bakke. 107 In this case, the 
interest in promoting the equality of black people in American society conflicted 
with the interests of meritocracy, and also with the interest of the claimant, a 
white student, to be admitted to University. The interest of affirmative action, as 
well as the interest of meritocracy and the interest of the white student to be 
accepted to the University, functioned as first-order interests in the case. They 
espousing substantive equality and a right to affirmative action, and arguing that such interpretations 
may conflict with the right to free speech).
105 See generally Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom? 47 STAN L. REV.
855 (1995).
106 See supra II.B especially the discussion of the second difference between accommodation 
claims and simple discrimination claims on page 19.
107
 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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were all valid claims for the maximal promotion of certain goods under the 
circumstances. They all had costs in terms of other valid claims, and they 
incidentally conflicted in the case. The case was therefore a balancing equal 
protection case. 108
Second-order equal protection cases are cases involving the second-order 
anti- discrimination principle conflicting with a first-order/excluded interest in 
discriminating. Such a conflict is a logical conflict, rather than an incidental 
conflict of costs and is resolved by excluding the discriminatory interest 
altogether, rather than by balancing. Probably the most notable such case is 
Brown v. Board of Education.109 The Court argued, in effect, that the separation 
between black and white students involved in the case, was motivated by 
illegitimate discriminatory motives, and that such motives should be totally 
invalidated, rather than balanced.110
Additional areas of constitutional law that can be interpreted according to the 
dual model include, the establishment clause,111 the constitutional right to 
108
 Since affirmative action plans are not motivated by illegitimate discriminatory motives, but 
rather by a legitimate motive of accommodation, persons badly affected by them do not hold a 
second-order right to exclude them. The harm caused by those plans to white students is analogous 
to the indirect harms, caused by regulations not aimed at speech, to those who’s speech is being 
restricted. Such harm is a valid first-order claim that should be balanced against opposing first-order 
considerations, but it does not espouse a second-order right to totally exclude opposing 
considerations.  Compare Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997).
109
 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110 See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 998 (arguing that Brown  is not a balancing case.) There is 
also another reading of the case, according to which it involves balancing. This reading is supported 
by certain passages in the Court’s opinion. However, I will argue that these passages misrepresent 
the real reasoning in the case, and do not reflect the proper reading of the case. See supra note 176
and accompanying text.
111 Compare Pildes, supra note 6, at 725-727, 750 (“the ‘right’ to freedom of religious 
conscience means that government may not act for the purpose of endorsing religion or religious 
sects.”)
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privacy,112 the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions113 the right to vote,114 and 
the right to travel.115
IV. THE HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING
Part III proved the claim that all (or most) constitutional rights do in fact 
generate both first-order (balanceable) and second-order (non-balanceable) 
claims. Or, alternatively, that each right is (potentially at least) both a right and an 
interest. This Part addresses the second claim that was made with regard to 
constitutional balancing: the claim that current constitutional doctrine fails to 
differentiate between the two types of constitutional claims because of the 
balancing consciousness. Rather than proving this second claim directly, this Part 
first explains how this confusion came about through a historical review of 
balancing in American constitutional law. Once the historical background for the 
confusion is understood it will become easier to outline the exact manifestations 
of the confusion in current constitutional law, which will be the task of Part V. 
A. Early Balancing
Balancing’s origins are usually identified with the appearance of the 
progressive movement in American legal thought in the early 20th century and 
with some of its leading figures, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound 
112 Compare Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989) 
(distinguishing between an interest in having maximal freedom from governmental intrusion into 
one’s privacy, and the much stronger right not to have one’s privacy restricted because of 
illegitimate governmental motives).
113 Compare Pildes, supra note  6, at 736-742.
114 Compare Id. at 741-745.
115 Compare C. Edwin Baker, Limitations on Basic Human Rights—A View From the United 
States, in THE LIMITATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75, 82-4 
(1986) (arguing that the “right” to travel is only affected if the regulation restricting travel is based 
on illegitimate motives.)
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and Harland Fiske Stone.116 In order to understand the role that balancing played 
in progressive thought and the exact use the progressives made of balancing one 
must understand the general agenda of progressivism in constitutional law.
Progressive jurisprudence in constitutional law was a reaction to late 19th
century constitutional jurisprudence and to what is now known as the Lochner
era.117 The Lochner era Court notoriously interpreted the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as banning almost any kind of governmental regulation of 
the market. It regarded any such regulation (setting maximum working hours in 
bakeries, for example118) as an unconstitutional abridgment of the right to 
contract, which is part of the liberty of the individual and therefore protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The progressives viewed such constitutional interpretation as an usurpation of 
judicial power. They accused the Lochner era Justices of “perverting” the words 
of the Constitution to suit their own free market ideology of laissez fair.119 The 
progressives countered this accusation with the concept of balancing. The Court, 
they argued, interpreted constitutional rights as if they were unambiguous hard 
116 See HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 18-19 (“The emergence of balancing tests in numerous areas 
of the law is a prominent measure of the success of Progressive legal thinkers in undermining 
categorical thought”); Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 948, 955 (“[B]alancing was a major break with 
the past, responding to the collapse of nineteenth century conceptualism and formalism…Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, the patron saint of all the various antiformalist schools, had fired the first 
salvos…Roscoe Pound broadened and deepened Holmes' attack”); Progressive balancing however is 
not one thing. One can distinguish two strands within progressive balancing, separating for example, 
Holmes’ balancing from Pound’s balancing. See Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The 
Holmesian Judge In Theory And Practice, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 19, 35-36 (1995).
117
 The era receives its name from the famous case, Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905), 
in which the Court repealed the New York Labor Law, which set maximum working hours in 
bakeries.
118 See Id.
119 See Justice Holmes’ famous words in his dissent in Lochner: "[A] Constitution is not 
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of 
the citizen to the state or of laissez faire... I think that the word 'liberty,' in the 14th Amendment, is 
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion"
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and fast rules that totally banned governmental regulatory policies, while, in 
effect, such rights were only standards or policies that had to be balanced with 
conflicting governmental policies.120
“The great constitutional guarantees of personal liberty and of property… are 
but statements of standards,” argued Justice Harland Fiske Stone, “they do not 
prescribe formulas to which governmental action must conform.”121 And Roscoe 
Pound, Dean of the Harvard Law School, wrote that it was only the ambiguity of 
the word “right” that allowed such rights as the right to contract to be interpreted 
as principles that are elevated above policy considerations. These “so called 
rights” argued Pound were but “individual claims, individual interests... on no 
lower plane [than the governmental policies that conflicted with them.]… There is 
a policy in the one case as much as in the other.”122 The standard for resolving 
constitutional conflicts, Pound concluded, must therefore be “a weighing or 
balancing of the various interests which overlap or come in conflict and a rational 
reconciling or adjustment.”123
This review of progressive balancing shows that the progressives used 
balancing in a way that was consistent with the dual model. Balancing was used 
to indicate that certain rights claims—claims under the due process clause, for 
example—functioned, in effect, as first-order claims only, and not as real rights 
claims. Due process claims, for example, were claims for the maximal furtherance 
of one social goal, one policy (liberty of contract) subject to reasonableness, and 
to balancing with other social goals and policies (such as equality in the job 
market). Such first-order policies were not elevated above any other first-order 
120 See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 953.
121
 Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23-24 (1936). 
122
 Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1943) (the paper was 
originally presented in 1921) (emphasis added).
123 Id. at 53.
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policies. The pretence that they were so elevated, argued the progressives, was 
due only to the ambiguity of the term “right.”124
Furthermore, the recognition that the matter was a matter of balancing led the 
progressives to the conclusion that balancing should be taken out of the hands of 
the Court altogether. How so? The Progressives argued that since the matter was a 
matter of policy, the Court should leave the matter completely to the legislative 
majority. This was another reaction to the jurisprudence of the Lochner era.
In the Lochner case, for example, the Court warned against subjecting 
constitutional rights, such as the right to the liberty of contract, to “the mercy of 
legislative majorities… [whenever there existed] the mere fact of the possible 
existence of some small amount of [damage to the public interest].”125 The 
progressives, on the other hand, thought that legislative majorities were fully 
entitled to have rights such as the right to liberty of contract at their mercy, since 
such rights were properly characterized as general standards of policy, rather than 
higher-level hard and fast rules. Holmes, therefore, famously accused the Court in 
Lochner of interfering with “the right of the majority to embody their opinions in 
law.”126 Pound, as previously mentioned, argued that “there was as much policy in 
the one case as in the other” (referring to rights and governmental interests).127
And the logical result of this line of argument to balancing was formulated by a 
latter day progressive Justice as follows: “[i]t is not our province to choose among 
124 Compare with Duncan Kennedy's similar description of the shift in private law 
jurisprudence in the 1940s: “One of the most striking developments of the 1940s was the 
transformation of the ‘formalist’ requirements of the will theory… into mere policies to be balanced 
within the larger analysis.” Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal 
Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western 
Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1073-74 (2004).
125 Supra note at 59 (Justice Peckham referring to the damage to the public interest in public 
health).
126 Id. at 75.
127
 Pound, supra note 122.
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competing considerations… [P]rimary responsibility for adjusting the interests… 
of necessity belongs to the Congress.”128
Rather than the tyranny of the majority over rights the progressives were 
afraid of the tyranny of rights over the majority. The individual rights rhetoric, 
they argued, was the Court’s tool in blocking the majority vote on issues of public 
policy. Balancing was the antidote—a way to uncover the mask of impartial and 
unfiltered interpretation of the Constitution and show that it was in fact filtered by 
the Court’s own ideological balancing. Once the problem was identified as a first-
order/balanceable conflict of policy, the progressives felt that the Court should 
leave the matter to the legislature, and not interfere with majoritarian balancing.129
128
 Justice Frankfurter in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis , 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940), and 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951).
129 See Grey, supra note 137, at 513-4 (“in Progressive jurisprudence… the policy dimension 
was integrated with a modest view of the role that… judges should play in the democratic 
lawmaking…The Progressive legislature had primary responsibility for making policy…; the main 
job of the Progressive… judges was to apply the rules laid down in legislation.”)
The above analysis of progressive balancing may raise the following question. How is it, one 
may ask, that judicial balancing is so closely associated with the progressives if the only thing they 
did was expose it and argue against it? The answer is that judicial balancing is associated with 
progressive balancing in private law, rather than in constitutional law. In private law, progressives 
saw a way to justify balancing by the judiciary, which was consistent with their identification of 
balancing with first-order, policy-oriented conflicts. For in private law, unlike in constitutional law, 
it was often the case that the legislature did not balance, but simply left matters unresolved. When 
undecided matters came to the Court it had to fill in the gaps that the legislature left, and in doing so 
it was acting, in effect, as a legislator and was therefore justified in using balancing. Constitutional 
cases, however, presented no such gaps. They were concerned with the review of decisions already 
made by the legislator. Constitutional cases were not about filling legislative voids, but about setting 
aside legislative decisions, and this, according to the progressives, could not have been done through 
balancing. The association of the progressives with constitutional balancing is therefore wrongly 
based on their view on balancing in private law. (I thank Thomas Grey for this observation.) 
Compare Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 948 (“Such methodology [balancing] may be an appropriate 
model for common law adjudication. But balancing needs to be defended in constitutional 
interpretation where the decision of a court supplants a legislative decision;”) Melville B. Nimmer,
The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied 
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B. Modern Balancing and the Rise of the Balancing Consciousness
This initial use of balancing, which I term early balancing, however, soon 
shifted and balancing became associated not with anti-rights rhetoric and judicial 
restraint, but with the opposite—rights rhetoric and judicial activism. This new 
phase of balancing, which is ongoing, will be referred to as modern balancing.
Modern balancing first appeared in constitutional law relatively early. It 
occurred in a line of free speech cases starting in the late 1930s discussed above 
and identified as first-order free speech cases.130 The Schneider case will be 
discussed here again since it is the best representation of the shift between early 
balancing and modern balancing and the emergence of the balancing 
consciousness. 131
Recall that the Court in Schneider identified the problem presented by the 
case as a problem of balancing between free speech and the interest of 
cleanliness.132 Knowing early balancing we would expect that once the case had 
been identified as a balancing case we would witness judicial claims such as the 
claim that the right is as much a policy as the conflicting interest, that the interest 
is on no lower plane than the right, and that the matter should be left to the 
legislature.133 In the judicial rhetoric of Schneider, however, we find the exact 
opposite. The Schneider opinion opens with a declaration that is more 
representative of the Lochner era’s rights rhetoric than of its progressive critics: 
This Court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as 
fundamental personal rights and liberties. [Therefore,] mere legislative 
preferences of beliefs respecting matters of public convenience … [are] 
insufficient to justify [the invasion of free speech.] And so, as cases arise the 
to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 939 (1968) (“Such an approach [balancing] may well be desirable 
with respect to nonconstitutional issues—in fact, it appears to be basic to the common law system.”)
130 See supra notes 70- 72 and accompanying text.
131
 Schneider v. State. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
132 See Schneider Id.
133 See supra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
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delicate and difficult task [of balancing the interest and the right] falls upon the 
court.134
 Not only is the right to free speech not lowered to the status of a policy 
interest, as it was during early balancing, it is raised above “mere legislative 
preferences,” so that a special burden is put on government to justify its invasion. 
Furthermore, the judicial deference is gone, and balancing is assigned squarely to 
the Court whenever the right of free speech is being implicated.
In terms of the dual model we have a problem. We find, on the one hand, 
rhetoric that is more consistent with a second-order/exclusionary interpretation of 
rights, certainly not with the idea of rights as same-level claimants for public 
resources. And, on the other hand, we find the actual decision made, as shown 
earlier, in terms of a first-order conflict—cleanliness and free speech are 
competing contenders for public resources and the matter is a matter of balancing. 
In fact what we witness in Schneider is the emergence of modern balancing 
and the balancing consciousness in constitutional law. No longer is balancing 
identified only with the first-order conception of rights, as in the progressive era, 
but with any conception of rights, indeed with the conception of rights generally. 
In this new attitude towards balancing, balancing rights and interests has become
the principal judicial task in constitutional law,135 without distinguishing between 
first-order and second-order types of rights. The result is the application of both 
balancing and rights rhetoric across the board in all types of constitutional cases, 
which has characterized modern balancing ever since.
Why did this change in balancing take place? In the following I will briefly 
address this question. I propose that this change occurred as a result of the 
following sequence of historical events.
By the late 1930s the battle against the Lochner era Court and its ideology of 
economic laissez fair that first triggered the use of balancing was over. New 
Justices were appointed to the Court and the new Court stopped actively 
134 Schneider, at 153-4. 
135 See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 1. 
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protecting laissez fair rights, and adopted the balancing rhetoric of its critics.136
However, by that time, a new set of problems had emerged. The European 
experience surrounding Nazi Germany and WWII brought the need to protect 
minority rights from the tyranny of the majority to the American consciousness.  
Rather than the minoritarian tyranny involved in free-market activism by the 
Court, the European experience stressed the danger of majoritarian tyranny over 
the civil and political rights of minorities.137 A new rhetoric of rights emerged, but 
this time, rather than being opposed to the rhetoric of balancing, it converged with 
it. This was so, because the balancing rhetoric was already imbedded in the new 
Court’s judicial worldview as part of its objection to the old Court. The result was 
that the use of balancing became identified with minority rights’ struggles (such 
as the free speech struggle of Jehovah Witnesses, the black civil rights movement, 
and the free speech struggle of the Vietnam War protestors) despite of the fact 
that it was first designed to deal with majoritarian problems and was appropriate 
for such problems.138
136 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 76 (1998) 
(“The New Deal Justices, appointed by Presidnet franklin Delano Roosvelt all agreed on one point: 
that the so-called Lochner era was a disaster.”)
137 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 Yale L.J. 493, 502-3 
(1996) (“the Nazi and Stalinist use of… a subservient political judiciary… increasingly dramatized 
the centrality of due process and legality to liberal democracy and put the Progressive and Realist 
jurists whose theories neglected or seemed to undermine these values on the defensive…A new 
liberal rule of law agenda began to emerge as the Court signaled its willingness to expand the ideal 
of equal justice under law to society’s outcasts and underdogs, its “discreet and insular minorities”.) 
Compare also with HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 247 (“post-war legal thought was powerfully shaped 
by efforts to square the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) with the 
half-century-old, post-Lochner, Progressive commitment to judicial restraint.”) The emphasis on 
minority rights was later strengthened by the emergence of the civil rights movement and the revival 
of rights-based moral and political philosophy in the early 1970s. See Grey, Id. at 505.
138
 The continued use of balancing in the post-New Deal era is best represented in the 
jurisprudence of Justice Felix Frnakfurter. See the discussion of Frnakfurter's use of balancing in the 
Dennis case, supra notes 157-167 and accompanying text.
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This explanation therefore suggests a path dependency problem concerning 
balancing. Once the path of balancing was taken, the Court kept using balancing, 
despite changed circumstances which made its use problematic. The kinds of 
confusions that this path dependency led to are explored below.
V. THE TWO PROBLEMS OF MODERN BALANCING 
Part III showed that constitutional rights generate both first-order 
(balanceable) and second-order (non-balanceable) claims. Part IV showed that 
modern balancing fails to differentiate between these two types of rights claims 
because of the balancing consciousness. This final Part of the Article will 
document the two major problems that this failure has generated within 
constitutional law. 
Since the balancing consciousness fails to differentiate between first-order 
and second-order rights it results in the following two distortions. First, as already 
alluded to in the case of Schneider, the balancing consciousness misapplies 
second-order/rights logic to first-order/interest conflicts. That is, it elevates a first-
order interest claim to the level of a second-order rights claim (the first-to-second 
order mix-up). It does so by treating an intra-level conflict between two first-order 
interests (the constitutional interest and the governmental interest), as an inter-
level conflict, in which the constitutional interest is elevated above the 
governmental interest, and the governmental interest subjected to high burdens of 
proof, high levels of scrutiny and the like.139 Secondly, the balancing 
consciousness also brings about the opposite, no less problematic, distortion; it 
applies first-order/interest logic, to second-order/rights conflicts. That is, it lowers
an actual second-order rights claim to the level of a mere interest claim, by 
subjecting it to the logic of first-order balancing (the second-to-first order mix-
139
 In fact this distortion is the same distortion of which the progressives accused the Lochner 
Court– reading too much into the right. The only difference is that now it is done through balancing, 
and not through a more categorical judicial rhetoric, so that balancing is actually instrumental in 
supporting an inappropriate non-balancing solution.
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up). Both distortions are omnipresent in constitutional law ever since the 
emergence of modern balancing. The following is a review of examples of both 
distortions in the three areas of constitutional law that were discussed in Part III—
free speech, the commerce clause, and equal protection.
A. Confusing First-Order with Second-Order Rights claims (The First-to-Second 
Order Mix-Up).
1. Free Speech
 Consider the Schneider case again,140 and how the balancing consciousness 
distorted the conflict that it actually presented. The application of the dual model 
showed that in Schneider free speech was a first-order claim. There was no 
excluded or illegitimate consideration involved in the conflict (such as 
illegitimately targeting speech because of its content). The free speech claim 
amounted only to a claim for directing resources to speech by excusing the speech 
activity from anti-litter regulations and making the city pay for more cleaning. 
However, as shown earlier, the Court, stressing that free speech was a 
“fundamental personal right,” placed the free speech interest at a higher position 
than the governmental interest, and stressed that “mere governmental preferences” 
were not enough to overcome free speech.141 This created an unnatural distortion 
in the nature of the conflict in the Schneider case, and overstated the strength of 
the free speech claim that it involved.
The rights rhetoric mistakenly made the free speech claim involved in 
Schneider seem as if it were different in nature than any other claim for social 
resources to a worthy cause, and it portrayed the governmental decision as if it 
involved something different than a policy decision, or a budgetary decision, 
regarding the allocation of resources between speech and several other worthy 
societal values. 
140 See supra note 70.
141 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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An example can illustrate this point. Think of a technology institute that 
created litter and also wished to be excused from anti-litter regulation, or an 
educational facility that created litter, or any other type of activity that we would 
want to encourage and also caused litter. Why should these activities be in an 
inferior position to a speech activity, such as distributing handbills, so that they 
could not equally compete for public resources in the form of excusing them from 
anti- litter regulations? Or, at least, why should the decision to excuse a speech 
activity from anti-litter regulation, and not these other socially important 
activities, be described as following from the fundamental right to free speech, 
rather than as a policy decision analogous to a decision about whether to sponsor 
a new Hyde Park so that there could be more speech, or to sponsor a new 
technology institute or school so that there could be more education or more 
science?
It seems, therefore, that the claim of free speech for higher status in cases 
such as Schneider emanates from cases such as Abrams, in which free speech is a 
second-order claim for abolishing illegitimate content-based restriction of speech. 
In such cases, as shown at length in Part III, free speech is indeed elevated above 
the conflicting interest of content based restriction of speech, because it is a 
second-order reason to exclude the illegitimate governmental reason altogether. 
But this special status is mistakenly applied, because of the coupling of the 
balancing consciousness and the rights rhetoric, to cases such as Schneider, in 
which speech is only a first-order reason for the allocation of resources.142
142
 Consider another hypothetical case to better illustrate the problems of overstating a first-
order free speech claim. Suppose a case involved a filmmaker that was in debt and faced 
bankruptcy. He argues constitutional protection of his free speech right against applying bankruptcy 
law to his case, since bankruptcy would not enable him to finish his film. No one suspects that the 
bankruptcy laws were devised in order to curb the message in his film, which is of no concern to 
anyone in the case. His claim is therefore a typical first-order free speech claim. It is a claim that 
society pays for his speech, in this case filmmaking, by relieving him of debt.  But, since rights-
based balancing does not distinguish between first-order and second-order free speech claims, his 
case would be treated as a case of infringing the fundamental right to free speech. This would imply 
that especially strong justifications must be presented to justify his creditors collecting from the 
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This first-to-second order mix-up in Schneider also has implications in terms 
of the justifications for judicial review. The mischaracterization of the case as a 
second-order/rights-oriented case may inappropriately strengthen the justifications 
for judicial review in the case, since rights-oriented infringements seem to carry 
with them greater justifications for judicial review than policy-oriented cases.143
The uncovering of the true nature of the case as a first-order/policy case, may 
suggest, therefore, that weaker justifications for judicial review existed in the 
case, than those that the Court portrayed.144 It may even suggest that the case 
should not have been regarded as within the scope of the First Amendment at 
all.145
filmmaker—justifications which are different in their strength from justification for collecting debts 
from any other regular debtor. The rights rhetoric may even suggest that a creditor, who holds only a 
regular interest in getting his money back, should prove that his interest in getting his money back 
justifies the burdening of such a fundamental interest as speech. 
Obviously his does not make sense. At the very least, one could say, that even if we would 
want a policy to have special debt reductions or tax reductions for people engaged in speech, this 
would not analytically follow from the idea of protecting the fundamental right to free speech. But, 
since modern balancing and the balancing consciousness do not differentiate between first-order and 
second-order speech claims, they do not give us the proper tools to show why the filmmakers’ 
hypothetical claim should be properly disregarded.
143 See, e.g., the progressive view on judicial review, supra note 129 and accompanying text.
144
 John Ely, for example, seems to have suggested that cases of indirect regulation of speech, 
such as Schneider, which I identify as first-order cases, deserve a more lenient standard of review 
that direct regulation of speech, such as the Flag Desecration cases, that I identify as second-order 
cases. See  Ely, supra note 91. Compare also with Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment 
Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1256 (1995).
145
 Several First Amendment theorists have promoted interpretations of the First Amendment, 
which resemble the idea that first-order free speech cases are not free speech cases at all. Such are 
theorists which believe that the main concern of the First Amendment is the protection against 
message-based censorship, and that the main question in First Amendment law, should be whether 
such message-based censorship was the basis of the governmental regulation of speech. Non 
content-based regulations, time place and manner regulations, and indirect infringements of speech, 
such as the ones involved in Schneider, are, according to such analyses completely outside the scope 
of First Amendment protection. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Limitations on Basic Human Rights—A 
View From the United States, in ARMAND DE MISTRAL ET AL (EDS.), THE LIMITATION OF HUMAN 
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Note that such conclusions do not logically follow from the dual model’s 
distinctions. The dual model only directs attention to the fact that the conflict 
should be properly regarded as first-order conflict and that the rights claim in the 
conflict should be properly regarded as a claim for the allocation of resources 
rather than as a typical rights claim. One may still hold the view that even in such 
policy- oriented conflicts the Court is justified in interfering with the legislative 
balance. What one cannot do, however, is use justifications for judicial review 
that rely on second-order rights claims to justify judicial review in first-order 
rights claims.146
RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75, at 80, 87 (1986) (“The right [of free speech] 
would not be a right to speak but a right to have the government not aim at suppressing speech… 
[Therefore] the government’s use of a time, place or manner regulation [of speech] should not in 
itself be taken as a limitation on the right of speech. Rather, an abridgment or limitation occurs only 
if the restriction of expressive conduct is the government’s purpose.”) See also Jed Rubenfeld, The 
First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001) (arguing that regulations not aimed at the 
suppression of the content of speech are outside the scope of the First Amendment,) and Elena 
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 415 (1996) (arguing for the centrality of governmental purpose to 
suppress the content of speech, in First Amendment law.) 
146 See also discussion in the CONCLUSION. There is another possible interpretation of the 
Schneider case, which would allow judicial review based on second-order justifications after all. 
According to this interpretation, the Schneider case was not a first-order case but a second-order 
case, since the real aim of the regulation was not avoiding litter but targeting the message of the 
handbills. This interpretation relies on the fact that some of the claimants in the case were Jehovah 
Witnesses. The balancing/first-order language is, according to this interpretation, only a means to 
‘smoke-out’ an illicit intent to curb the message of speech, hidden by the neutral language of the 
regulation. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Notes for a Theory of Constrained Balancing in First 
Amendment Cases: An Essay in Honor of Tome Emerson, 38 CASE WEST. RESERVE L. REV. 576, 
582 (1988) (“I suspect that many judges, lacking hard evidence of motive, use [balancing] as 
evidentiary shorthand that generates a degree of doubt as to the censor's true motive… When a 
balancing court sets aside an anti-littering ordinance, it is often because it senses an unacceptably 
high level of risk that a political majority has proffered an asserted interest in clean streets as a 
pretext to limit disfavored or annoying speech.”); Compare Rubenfeld Id. at 831-2 (arguing that 
Schneider involved message-based regulation); Compare Regan supra note 98 (arguing for the 
‘smoking-out’ function of balancing in commerce clause law). Such analyses of the ‘smoking-out’ 
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2. Dormant Commerce Clause 
The first-to-second order mix-up is even more obvious in the area of the 
dormant commerce clause than in the free speech area. Consider the case of 
Arizona that was discussed in Part III.147 The dual model identified the conflict in 
that case as a first-order conflict between safety and free interstate commerce—
the Arizona regulation of standard length trains increased interstate commerce 
costs, but decreased safety risks. There was no indication of an illegitimate 
protectionist motive to prefer local train companies to out-of-state train companies 
in banning long trains in Arizona.148 Nevertheless, if one examines the judicial 
rhetoric in the case, one finds that the Court subjected the interest of safety to 
special justifications that it had to overcome in order for it to defeat the commerce 
clause interest in the balance. It justified these special burdens by arguing that the 
commerce clause interest was a constitutional right and that therefore special 
justifications were needed in order for conflicting policies (such as safety) to 
overcome it.149
function of balancing do not contradict the dual model, but rather can be imposed on the model as 
an overlay. 
147
 Southern Pacific Company Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761. See supra note 99 and 
accompanying text.
148
 Recall that the discussion in Part III.C distinguished between the first-order commerce 
clause interest, which is the interest in promoting swift interstate commerce, and the second-order 
commerce clause right, which was a right against protectionism of local industry over out-of-state 
industry. 
149 See 325 U.S. 770-71:
The matters for ultimate determination here are the nature and extent of the burden which 
the state regulation of interstate trains… imposes on interstate commerce, and whether the 
relative weights of the state and national interests involved are such as to make 
inapplicable the rule, generally observed, that the free flow of interstate commerce and its 
freedom from local restraints… are interests safeguarded by the commerce clause from 
state interference.
(Stone, J. writing for the Court).
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However, once the first-order nature of the commerce claim in Arizona is 
realized, it is hard to see why the commerce clause interest should receive such 
prima facie higher status than other considerations, such as safety. After all, as a 
first-order interest in promoting the swift commerce between states, interstate 
commerce is burdened in numerous ways, most of them quite unproblematic 
(health inspections, drug trafficking inspections, even speeding laws, all burden 
the swift transport of goods between one state and another). Is it really the case 
that in all of these cases we would wish to grant a special status to the commerce 
clause interest, so that other interests, such as safety or health, would have to be 
especially strong in order to overcome it in the balance? Or, at the very least, 
should the question of which interest to promote be framed any differently than a 
question of policy, or a budgetary question of allocating resources? 150
It seems therefore that, as in the area of free speech, a special status is 
inappropriately attributed to first-order commerce clause claims in cases such as 
Arizona as a result of confusing them with second-order commerce clause cases. 
In second-order commerce clauses cases the commerce clause claim is indeed 
elevated above the governmental interest. This is so, since the governmental 
interest in such cases is an illegitimate protectionist interest, which is totally 
excluded by the commerce clause interest. But, first-order commerce clause cases 
present claims of a different nature. They do not argue protectionist motive, but 
only seek to further the interest of swift interstate commerce. The coupling of the 
balancing consciousness and the rights rhetoric distorts this fact. 151
150 See Id. (“the determination [of the length of trains] is a matter of public policy”) (Black, J. 
dissenting).
151 See Regan, supra note 97, at 1128 (“When we say every producer ought to have access to 
all the country's markets, what we mean is just that he should not be shut out of any market by 
preferential trade regulations directed against him as a foreigner… If [a] law incidentally diverts 
some business to local producers, that is a matter of no constitutional significance.”); See Bendix 
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (“The scale analogy is not really 
appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate.  It is more like judging whether a 
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment. 
Expressing hostility towards judicial balancing in commerce clause jurisprudence, and preferring 
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As with free speech, the uncovering of a case as a first-order case may 
suggest that justifications for judicial review were overstated in the case and that 
balancing should be left to the legislature. It may also suggest that the case is of 
no constitutional concern at all.152 Justice Black therefore concludes his analyses 
of the Arizona case by arguing: “the balancing of these probabilities, however, is 
not in my judgment a matter of judicial determination, but one that calls for 
legislative consideration.”153
3. Equal Protection
The first-to-second order mix-up is also evident in the third area of 
constitutional law that was reviewed in Part III—equal protection. A good 
example for this mix-up is the famous Bakke case that was analyzed in Part III.154
In this case, a white medical student claimed to hold a strong equal protection 
right against applying the affirmative action plan to his case. The Court agreed, 
and interpreted his claim as a high-status rights claim. Consequently the Court 
subjected the conflicting interest—the interest behind the affirmative action 
plan—to strict scrutiny.155 However, the dual model analysis in Part III shows that 
Bakke involved only a first-order conflict between two, same-level considerations: 
the interest behind the affirmative action plan (a diverse student body, for 
example) and the conflicting interest that was burdened by the plan (meritocracy 
in higher education, for example). Bakke’s claim therefore did not espouse 
illegitimate, animus-based simple discrimination against white people. It 
instead a rule against facially discriminatory laws.)
152 See Regan Id; Southern Pacific Company Co. v. Arizona (“The fact that grade crossing 
improvement [improvements associated with the move to shorter trains] may be expensive is no 
sufficient reason to say than an unconstitutional ‘burden’ is put upon a railroad even though it be an 
interstate road.”) (Black, J. dissenting).
153
 325 U.S. 794.
154
 Bakke v. California, 438 U.S. 265. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
155 Id. at 291 (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for 
the most exacting judicial examination.") (Justice Powell casting the crucial fifth vote in a divided 
Court).
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espoused only a policy consideration (meritocracy) that was burdened by the 
affirmative action plan. Therefore it should not have been accorded the same 
status as a simple discrimination (second-order) claim. In terms of judicial review, 
this realization is translated into arguments against the application of strict 
scrutiny to the case, or even against any judicial interference at all.156
In conclusion, the analysis of several first-order cases shows that the Court, 
because of the balancing consciousness and the rights rhetoric, applied a rights-
oriented balancing to them that in fact confused them with second-order cases. 
The next section discusses the opposite problem caused by the balancing 
consciousness: the tendency of the balancing consciousness to level the conflict 
even when it should properly be treated as a conflict between a higher-level right 
and a lower-level interest. 
B. Confusing Second-Order with First-Order Rights claims (The Second-to-First 
Order Mix-Up).
The second confusion caused by the balancing consciousness and the rights-
rhetoric is just as problematic as the first—arguably even more so. It results when 
first-order analysis and balancing are applied to second-order/exclusionary rights. 
While the first problem was elevating a first-order interest to the status of a 
second-order right, this problem consists of lowering a second-order right to the 
level of a first-order interest (the second-to-first order mix-up). Here lies the 
danger of diluting an exclusionary right, and finding it easier to uphold 
illegitimate governmental considerations by balancing them rather than excluding 
them. In addition, the Court might understate the justification for judicial review 
since it would view the conflict as a policy conflict and not as an exclusionary 
conflict. An analysis of the three areas of constitutional law, as they relate to this 
156 Compare Rubenfeld, supra note 108 (arguing against subjecting affirmative action plans to 
strict scrutiny).
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set of problems, follows. The discussions of free speech and equal protection are 
divided into two sections: confusions in rhetoric and confusions in the result.
1. Free Speech
1. Consider one of the infamous cases of the McCarthy era, Dennis v. United 
States,157 which involved a conspiracy conviction against the leaders of the 
American Communist Party. This case, like other McCarthy era cases, was 
identified in Part III as a second-order case of direct infringement of speech.158
Part III argued that the McCarthy era cases involved governmental attempts to 
suppress a certain political point of view, namely communism.159 As such, they 
involved a conflict between a second-order free speech claim to completely 
exclude governmental intervention in the free market of ideas, and a 
governmental first-order interest in such intervention.
However, Justice Frankfurter concurring in the case, portrayed the conflict in 
different terms:
Our judgment is thus solicited on a conflict of interests of the utmost concern to 
the well-being of the country [free speech and national security]. This conflict of 
interests cannot be resolved by a dogmatic preference for one or the other, nor by 
a sonorous formula which is in fact only a euphemistic disguise for an unresolved 
conflict. If adjudication is to be a rational process, we cannot escape a candid 
examination of the conflicting claims with full recognition that both are supported 
by weighty title-deeds.160
This passage shows that Frankfurter portrayed the conflict in the Dennis case 
as a typical first-order conflict between two same-level interests, rather than, as a 
second-order conflict between claims of two different levels. Both free speech and 
national security were portrayed as legitimate interests “supported by weighty 
157
 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951).
158 See cases cited in note 81 supra.
159 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
160 Id. at 519.
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title-deeds,” with no “dogmatic preference for one or the other.” Balancing was 
therefore, according to Frankfurter, the only rational choice.161 Such 
characterization of the conflict mischaracterized the conflict and lowered the 
claimant’s free speech claim in the case into a mere policy claim. Once the free 
speech is lowered to the level of a policy claim, it becomes much easier to arrive 
at the final problematic outcome of the case—upholding the conviction of the 
communist party leaders162
Confusing the case with a first-order free speech case further misrepresented 
the issue of the cost of allowing more speech and the non-absolute nature of free 
speech. In Dennis these costs were presumably the dangers ensuing from the 
communist message. Balancing was therefore argued to be inevitable unless free 
speech were to become an absolute value163 giving people “unlimited license to 
talk.” 164
However, this argument too confuses between a first-order and a second-order 
claim. As the discussion in Part II and III showed the anti-absolutist argument is 
appropriate only with regard to first-order claims, not second-order claims. 
Second-order claims are not reliant on resources and costs, but rather express an 
161 See Id.; "The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in 
national security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, 
within the confines of the judicial process." Id. at 525.
162
 It further diverted any attempt to portray the governmental motive as an illegitimate motive 
of suppressing speech, since, by definition, a balancing/ first-order solution implied that both 
interests in the conflict were legitimate.
163
 "Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions... The demands of free speech 
in a democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and 
informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by 
announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non- Euclidian problems to be solved." Id. at 525.
164
 Quoting Justice Harlan in another case of the McCarthy era, Konigsberg v. State Bar 366 
U.S. 36 (1961) “Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized [that] constitutionally 
protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk. [When] constitutional 
protections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be 
affected and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved.”
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earlier decision on costs.165 The second-order free speech norm in particular 
expresses an earlier decision to disregard some of speech’s costs, i.e. those costs 
ensuing from allowing a free market of ideas. The argument that free speech has 
costs and has to be balanced, therefore, diverts attention from the claim that an 
earlier decision on costs has already been made by the free speech norm itself. 
Justice Black, dissenting in Dennis, makes a similar point:
Undoubtedly, a governmental policy of unfettered communication of ideas does 
entail dangers.  To the Founders of this Nation, however, the benefits derived 
from free expression were worth the risk.  They embodied this philosophy in the 
First Amendment's command that “Congress shall make no law… abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press…”166
Dennis is therefore a case in which the balancing consciousness confuses a 
second-order right claim with a first-order interest claim. The second-order right 
claim is stripped of its special status as an exclusionary claim, because it is 
confused with cases in which it is only a first-order policy claim for resources. 
This second-to-first order mix-up is a mirror of the first-to-second order mix-up 
that was discussed earlier. In the former mix-up, the coupling of rights rhetoric 
with balancing caused a first-order claim to be given an inappropriate “dogmatic” 
preference 167 over a conflicting first-order claim. Here, the coupling of a 
balancing rhetoric with rights caused a second-order claim to be inappropriately 
reduced to the level of the conflicting claim, instead of being appropriately 
separated from it as a higher-level claim.
The historical explanation given earlier seems to give a good account of why 
this happened. Frankfurter was a latter day progressive who believed in the 
progressive legacy of rejecting absolutes and using balancing.  However, 
Frankfurter applied anti-absolutism and balancing even when the conflict was no 
longer a conflict over economic laissez faire, as in the Lochner era, but a conflict 
over political speech suppression as in the Dennis case. The result was that his 
165 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
166 Id. at 580.
167 Compare with Frankfurter's words quoted supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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anti- absolutism and balancing were misapplied to a second-order conflict, and the 
second type of mix-up was generated.168
Finally the second-to-first order mix-up also has implications in terms of 
justifications for judicial review. The mischaracterization of the case as a first-
order case understates the justifications for judicial review in the case and makes 
judicial restraint easier in the face of quite obvious attempts at suppression of 
political speech. On the other hand, the uncovering of the true nature of the case 
as a second-order case of illegitimate governmental motive would lead one to the 
opposite conclusion. According to this analysis the Court must interfere and 
abolish illegitimate suppression of ideas if it is to be loyal to the second-
order/exclusionary command of free speech. It cannot withhold its review in cases 
of claims of reasonable governmental balance, since the question is not a question 
of balancing at all, but of exclusion.169
2. Other free speech cases also involve the second-to-first order mix-up, but 
only in rhetoric, not in the result. This mix-up in rhetoric rather than in the result 
has a host of problems of its own. A good example is a case involving free speech 
in education. In Board of Education v. Pico,170 a school board decided to remove 
nine books from the school library because of their “anti-American, anti-Christian 
[and] anti-Semitic” content.171 The school board’s removal of the books was quite 
obviously based on objections to the message in the books, and therefore 
appeared to involve an illegitimate message-based interference in the market of 
ideas. The Court therefore appropriately held that, under certain circumstances, 
such removal would violate the First Amendment.172 However, instead of 
168 See the historical discussion in Part IV.B.
169
 This is therefore Justice Black’s conclusion in Dennis: “So long as this Court exercises the 
power of judicial review of legislation, I cannot agree that the First Amendment permits us to 
sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis of Congress' or our own notions 
of mere 'reasonableness.'” Id. at 580.
170
 457 U.S. 853 (1981).
171 457 U.S., at 857 (quoting the reasoning of the school board’s decision).
172
 The Court remanded the case for further fact finding regarding the exact bases for the 
decision to remove the books. Id., at 883 (plurality opinion of Justice Brennan.)
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reasoning its decision by arguing that free speech made the school board’s 
message-based censorship illegitimate and excluded, the Court argued that a 
balance had to be struck between free speech and the school board’s interest. The 
children of the school, the Court argued, had a free speech interest to receive 
information and this interest had to be balanced with the school board’s interest to 
inculcate community values to the children of the community. In this balancing 
act, the Court maintained, the free speech interest outbalanced and overrode the 
community interest.
Such balancing-oriented portrayal of the case misrepresented the real conflict 
in the case, and made it easier to criticize the judicial opinion. Why is it, one may 
ask, that the interest in inculcating community values was overridden by the 
children’s interest in receiving information? How did the Court weigh the 
competing interests in order to arrive at this conclusion? Balancing gives a poor 
explanation the Court’s decision. This is so, since the decision was actually based 
on an exclusionary logic, and not on balancing. According to this logic, the school 
board’s interest was not overridden by speech, but was simply made irrelevant by 
speech. Free speech means that one cannot suppress certain ideas only because 
they contradict community values. Indeed, ideas that need protection most are 
those that contradict community values the most. Some damage to the inculcation 
of community values is therefore a cost, which is disregarded by an earlier 
decision on costs, expressed by the second-order free speech norm of the free 
market of ideas. As such it should not be balanced with free speech at all.
Although the case ended in a decision in favor of free speech, and therefore 
included only a mix-up in rhetoric, not in the result, its implications are not only 
rhetorical. For the outcome of the reasoning in rhetorical confusion cases, such as 
Pico, is a dilution of the analytical strength of the rights claim. Such dilution 
might invite real future infringements of the second-order right, as in the case of 
Dennis.
2. Dormant Commerce Clause 
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How does the second-to-first order mix-up present itself in the area of 
commerce clause jurisprudence? In this area, a second-to-first order mix-up 
would mean balancing a totally illegitimate protectionist motive, instead of 
absolutely excluding it. This could lead the Court to uphold regulations despite an 
illegitimate protectionist motive (confusion in result) or it could lead the Court to 
repeal the regulation, but justify it, inappropriately, in balancing terms instead of 
in exclusionary terms (confusion in rhetoric). 
In the Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, discussed in 
Part III,173 the Court was guilty of confusion in rhetoric. As argued earlier, a close 
reading of the case shows that the Court identified an illegitimate protectionist 
motive to prevent out-of-state competition. It therefore appropriately repealed the 
regulation. But instead of reasoning this repeal by saying that the commerce 
clause (second-order) interest completely excluded an illegitimate protectionist 
interest, the Court inappropriately reasoned it through balancing. It said that the 
interest in free interstate commerce overrode the legitimate interest of the state in 
regulating commerce.174
This confusion led to the same problems that were identified in free speech 
rhetorical confusion cases. The decision was poorly reasoned and its true nature 
distorted.175 As in the area of free speech, this confusion was due to the balancing 
consciousness. The progressive influenced tendency of the balancing 
consciousness to view every decision as a policy conflict between two legitimate 
interests, has blurred the distinction between the two types of commerce clause 
claims and flattened anti-protectionist claims into being only first-order claims for 
more free interstate commerce.
173
 432 U.S. 333 (1977). See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
174
 “We are confronted with the task of effecting an accommodation of the competing national 
and local interests.” (Justice Burger, writing for the Court). Justice Burger consequently found that 
the national interest overrode the local interest. Id., at 350.
175
 See Regan, supra note 97, at 1208 referring to the Hunt case: “the balancing language is 
only a veneer which has virtually nothing to do with the Court's effective decision process as 
revealed in the parts of the opinions where the cases are actually disposed of.” 
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3. Equal Protection
Finally, in the area of equal protection and the right to equality, confusion 
between first-order and second-order claims would mean treating the second-
order equal protection norm (the norm against simple-discrimination) as if it were 
only a first-order equal protection interest (the interest in furthering more equality 
or integration). Such confusion would dilute the strength of the second-order 
equal protection principle and mischaracterize it as if it were merely a policy 
claim that had to be balanced with other claims.
1. Let us look first at an example of confusion in rhetoric only. In Part III, the 
case that was discussed as the typical second-order equal protection case was 
Brown v. Board of Education. However, even in Brown there seems to be a 
confusion of the equal protection second-order claim—the claim to completely 
abolish discrimination based on race animus—with the equal protection first-
order claim—the claim to further the integration of blacks into society. This 
confusion is evident in the passages of the opinion that refer to the psychological 
effects of desegregation on the self-image of black students and in the famous 
footnote 11.176 Such passages may suggest that the Court viewed the case as a 
policy case, in which the costs of desegregation (such as the psychological effects 
of school segregation on black students) were balanced with the costs of 
integration and found to outbalance them. However, this first-order/balancing 
portrayal of the reasoning in Brown seems to mischaracterize the equal protection 
claim in Brown, and also the Court’s own thought process. This is so, since it is 
quite evident that the Court could have found no empirical argument or policy 
argument to justify southern segregation in public schools. The actual idea behind 
176 See Brown 691-2: “To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone… this finding is amply supported 
by modern [psychological] authority” The Court then cites several psychological studies to show 
psychological damage from desegregation, in the famous footnote 11, of the case.
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the case (and the way it is publicly perceived) is that segregation amounted to 
discrimination and was therefore totally invalid and excluded.177
As in the areas of free speech and commerce clause, this confusion is due to 
the balancing consciousness. The balancing consciousness does not distinguish 
between the two types of equal protection claims, and subsequently lowers the 
second-order simple discrimination claim in Brown into a first-order claim for 
accommodation. Here too, this tendency of the Court can be explained by a 
progressive heritage. The progressive heritage of pragmatism and instrumentalism 
encouraged empirical, policy-oriented examination of every judicial problem.178
However, even though this tendency was appropriate to first-order cases such as 
those involved in the Lochner era, it was inappropriate to second-order cases, 
such as Brown.
2. In Brown the second-to-first order mix-up was a mix-up in the rhetoric 
only, since the Court actually repealed the discriminatory regulation. Are there 
cases of equal protection, second-to-first order mix-ups in the result also? A 
recent equal protection case, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,179 may represent 
such a mix-up. The balancing rhetoric in that case allowed the Court to actually 
uphold and legitimize simple discrimination against homosexuals. 
The Boy Scouts case involved a dismissal of an assistant scoutmaster due only 
to the fact that he was a homosexual. On its face, this appears to be a classic case 
of simple discrimination. The assistant scoutmaster was dismissed because of 
homophobic sentiments, which should have been totally excluded as illegitimate 
because of the second-order equal protection norm against simple discrimination. 
However, the Court, aided by the balancing consciousness, interpreted the case 
177 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 998 arguing that Brown was based on the rejection of 
discrimination and not on balancing: “Of course… there were competing interests at stake. But the 
Court based its decision--as has society--not on the balance of those interests, but on the 
intolerability of racial discrimination.”
178 See Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005) (arguing that Brown—specifically footnote 11— contributed to law's 
increasingly multidisciplinary and empirical character).
179
 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
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differently. By applying balancing, the Court channeled the decision into the 
terms of two competing legitimate interests. The Court found such legitimate 
interest on the side of the Boy Scouts in their interest to “expressive association.”
The Court held that “the forced inclusion of [the homosexual scoutmaster] would 
significantly affect [the Boy Scouts'] expression,”180 and maintained that a balance 
should be struck between the “associational interest in freedom of expression… 
on one side of the scale, and the State's interest on the other.”181 Finally the Court 
found that the expressional interest overrode the State’s interest, and ruled in 
favor of the Boy Scouts.
In terms of the dual model, this case represents the problematic lowering of a 
second-order claim to the level of a first-order claim. The claimant’s second-order 
equal protection claim was lowered to the level of a first-order claim. Instead of 
excluding the Boys Scouts’ interest altogether because of the equal protection 
norm, the Court balanced it with the equal protection norm, and finally found that 
it overrode that norm.
The Boy Scouts case is a good example of the problems of modern balancing 
for another reason as well. This case is not only a striking case of lowering the 
claimant’s second-order claim to a first-order claim, it is also a case of elevating
the respondent’s first-order claim—the Boys Scouts’ free speech claim—to the 
level of a second-order claim. It thus represents both problems of modern 
balancing, and is an appropriate case to conclude this discussion with.
Consider the Boy Scouts’ free speech claim. Their claim was not a claim to 
abolish illegitimate message-based discrimination against their speech. This is so, 
since anti-discrimination regulations, such as the New Jersey law that banned the 
Boy Scouts’ discrimination, were not motivated by any cognizable animus 
towards the Boy Scouts’ message. The Boys Scouts could have advocated 
homophobic messages as much as they wanted. The only thing that these 
regulations banned was actual discrimination against homosexuals. In terms of the 
analysis in Part III, this means that the anti-discrimination laws affected the Boy 
180 Id. at 2455.
181 Id. at 2456.
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Scouts’ speech only indirectly (by limiting their ability to express themselves 
through discrimination) or, alternatively, that the Boy Scouts’ claim was a claim 
that society accommodate their expressive conduct by excusing them of the anti-
discrimination principle.182 The Boy Scouts could therefore show, at most, only a 
first-order free speech interest, to be excused from anti-discrimination regulation. 
As such their first-order interest should have been properly excluded by the 
second-order equal protection norm against simple discrimination. Instead it was 
elevated to the level of a second-order free speech claim, and subsequently it 
outbalanced the equal protection norm.
VI. CONCLUSION
The dual model argues for an important distinction between two types of 
constitutional claims and two types of constitutional conflicts—first-order and 
second-order claims and conflicts. It further argues that the idea that every 
constitutional conflict is about balancing—the balancing consciousness—fails to 
distinguish between these two types of claims and conflicts, and consequently 
distorts their nature. 
The first implication of this analysis is that balancing in second-
order/exclusionary conflicts, when the constitutional right is properly interpreted 
as a second-order consideration, which totally excludes the governmental 
consideration, is inappropriate. If one agrees that certain rights should be properly 
interpreted as totally excluding certain governmental interests, one must deny the 
possibility that the judicial task in protecting these rights is a task of balancing. 
Indeed the main fault of balancing in such cases is in distorting the nature of these 
conflicts. The balancing consciousness portrays such conflicts as conflicts 
between two legitimate interests, in which the problem is a problem of 
proportionality, while in effect the problem in such cases is the problem of the 
legitimacy of one of the interests—the governmental interest. Instead of 
182 Compare with the analysis of the Schneider case, according to which, the claimant’s in 
Schneider, asked that their speech be accommodated by excusing them from anti-litter regulations.
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concentrating on determining the conditions under which the governmental 
interest is legitimate, the balancing consciousness therefore pushes the decision-
maker straight to the second stage of checking the governmental interest’s 
proportionality, diverting attention from the question of legitimacy. Historical 
examples, such as the Court’s record in protecting free speech during the 
McCarthy era, point at the dangers of this distortion. Current conflicts between 
national security and individual rights, may arguably present similar dangers.
The second implication of this analysis concerns first-order conflicts. Here, 
the identification of the case as a first-order conflict may not be conclusive 
regarding the question of balancing. One may hold, as the progressives did, that 
once the conflict is identified as a first-order conflict its solution is properly left to 
the legislature, and hence, that there should be no judicial balancing in 
constitutional law. That is, although the conflict is indeed a balancing conflict, it 
does not call for judicial balancing, but rather for legislative balancing. One may, 
however, hold a different view on this matter and still be loyal to the dual model. 
One may hold, for example, that the fact that a conflict is a first-order, policy 
conflict or a budgetary conflict does not make the Court’s balancing in the case 
inappropriate. Or, one may hold, that the Court’s balancing is appropriate only is 
some first-order conflicts and not in others. These determinations will depend on 
jurisprudential views regarding the proper role of the Court in the democratic 
framework, which are not discussed by the dual model. The dual model, however, 
clarifies the terms under which such determinations ought to be made.  
